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THE EFFECT OF EXPECTANCY ON ATTITUDE CHANGE IN COMMUNICATION
CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION
Scholars of communication from ancient to modern times have 
recognized the impact of the speaker's character in effecting persuasion. 
While the studies of communication have separated the source from the 
message for purposes of examining traits that are unique to each, the 
partition is difficult to handle in actual communication situations. From 
the vantage point of a listener, the source of a message and the message 
are an entity--the second being an extension of the first.
Classical rhetorical theorists recognized the interaction of 
source and message and have both described and prescribed techniques and 
traits which a speaker can use to enhance the effectiveness of his speech. 
Originating with Aristotle and still widely used by communication 
theorists, the term ethos has been assigned to the type of proof which 
is found in the character of the speaker.
Aristotle recognized three modes of artistic proofs which belong
to the art of rhetoric. Ethos is one of these. He writes:
Persuasion is achieved by the speaker's personal character when the 
speech is so spoken as to make us think him credible. We believe 
good men more fully and more readily than others: this is true
generally whatever the question is, and absolutely true where 
exact certainty is impossible and opinions are divided.
This kind of persuasion, like the others, should be achieved by 
what the speaker says, not by what people think of his 
character before he begins to speak. It is not true, as 
some writers assume in their treatises on rhetoric, that 
the personal goodness revealed by the speaker contributes 
nothing to his power of persuasion; on the contrary, his 
character may almost be called the most effective means of 
persuasion he possesses.^
Here Aristotle is reluctant to recognize the ethos or "reputation" 
that a speaker often brings with him from outside the communication situa­
tion; however, Aristotle's discussion of language provides an indirect 
handling of an ethos which deals with factors outside a specific 
communication situation. In other words, the speaker, in order to have 
his listeners think favorably of him, must display signs of genuineness 
that are unique to persons the audience thinks well of. Aristotle 
writes :
This aptness of language is one thing that makes people believe 
in the truth of your story: their minds draw the false conclusion
that you are to be trusted from the fact that others behave as 
you do when things are as you describe them; and therefore they 
take your story to be true whether it is so or not. . . . This way 
of proving your story by displaying these signs of its genuine­
ness expresses your personal character. Each class of men, each 
type of disposition, will have its own appropriate way of letting 
the truth appear. . . .  By 'dispositions' I here mean those 
dispositions only which determine the character of a man's life, 
for it is not every disposition that does this. If, then, a 
speaker uses the very words which are in keeping with a particu­
lar disposition, he will reproduce the corresponding character; 
for a rustic and an educated man will not say the same things 
nor speak in the same w a y .2
Aristotle is obviously aware of the speaker and message interaction. 
Also, the speech and speaker are mutually interdependent; that is to. say,
^Rhetoric. tr. W. Rhys Roberts, in Aristotle, ed. F. Solmsen 
(New York: Modern Library Press, 1954), 1356&.
2lbid.. 140Sa.
3the speaker, by illustrating good character can enhance the effectiveness 
of his speech and, also, the speech, with the proper content, delivery 
techniques, etc., can enhance the speaker's character in the eyes of the 
audience.
In the Roman period, writers discussed the interaction of speaker
and speech within a concept of the "ideal orator." While they used the
term ethos. they also used other terms to refer to this interaction.
For example, Cicero, referring to the forensic advocate, writes:
A potent factor in success . . .  is the characters, principles, 
conduct and course of life of both of those who are to plead 
cases . . . and for the tribunal to be won over, as far as 
possible, to good will toward the advocate. . . .  So much is
done by good taste and style in speaking, that the speech seems
to depict the speaker's character. For by means of particular 
types of thought and diction . . . speakers are made to appear 
upright, well-bred and virtuous men.^
Also writing during the Roman period, Quintilian states:
• . . being not only mild and placid, but for the most part, 
pleasing and polite, and amiable and attractive to the hearers; 
and the greatest merit in the expression of it, is that it
^ethoB2 should seem to flow from the nature of the things and
persons with which we are concerned, so that the moral character 
of the speaker may clearly appear, and be recognized as it 
were, in his discourse.^
Following the fall of the Roman Empire, rhetorical theorists pro­
pagated the basic concept of Aristotle's ethos, but often assigned 
different terminology to it. "Ethical," "character," "propriety," and 
"the becoming," are some of the names substituted for a similar concept;
^De Oratore. tr. E. W. Sutton (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univer­
sity Press, 1942), I, 327-329.
^Institutes of Oratory, tr. John S. Watson (London: George
Bell and Sons, 1891), VI, 423-424.
however, the concept remained largely as Aristotle had defined it.^
Following the Renaissance, the Aristotelian concept of ethos was
clarified and expanded in the works of the eighteenth and nineteenth
centuries. One of the many examples is in George Campbell's Philosophy
of Rhetoric. Discussing the effect of speaker ethos on the success of
the speech, he writes:
. . . for to be good is the only sure way of being long esteemed
good, and to be esteemed good is previously necessary to one's
being heard with due attention and regard.°
Here Campbell does not limit the effect of ethos to the immediate speaking
situation, but expands it to include the entire reputation of the speaker
as a good man. Campbell also recognizes the effect the speech might
have upon the audience's estimation of the speaker. He states:
Sympathy in the hearers /approval of the speaker/ may be lessened 
several ways, chiefly by these two: by a low opinion of his
intellectual abilities and by a bad opinion of his morals.^
In contemporary times, the concept of ethos in the field of speech 
is still prominent. Modern rhetors reassert the "modes of ethical pcoof" 
which stem from the original Greek and Roman formulations.® Modern 
researchers have subjected the concept Co. more, tigorous empirical 
investigation, studying the interaction between the source of a message 
and the message. Some of the empirical studies of this concept will be
^William M. Settler, "Conceptions of Ethos in Rhetoric" (unpublished 
Ph.D. dissertation. Northwestern University, 1941), p. 232.
^George Campbell, Philosophy of Rhetoric (New York: Harper and
Brothers, 1871), p. 119.
7lbid.
8Such as Donald C. Bryant and Karl R. Wallace, Fundamentals of 
Public Speaking (New York: Appleton Century Croft, Inc., 1959), p. 298.
5discussed in Chapter II.
The concept of source and message interaction has practical as well 
as theoretical popularity. The politician and other speakers have long 
relied upon "I am against sin" speeches to enhance their "characters" 
before their audiences. Likewise, proponents of specific causes have 
long sought prestigious sources (the classical good man) to lend credence 
to their purposes. Kate Smith selling war bonds, John Glenn speaking 
for the Boy Scouts, President Johnson's election year "war on poverty" 
campaign, are but a few examples in which the cause benefits from its 
source or the source benefits from the concept he is associated with.
Most of the empirical studies of source credibility'have been 
studies of the effect relative degrees of speaker influence have in the 
audience's acceptance of the content of the message. Relatively little 
research has been conducted to determine the effect of message content on 
the audience's acceptance of the speaker.
The interaction between source and message is the area which this 
study proposes to investigate. The study will deal with three general 
variables which may account-for the largest portion of attitude change 
toward both source and the topic of a message. These variables are:
(1) the expectancy of the recipient, (2) incongruency perceived by the 
recipient, i.e., the recipient's awareness of the difference between his 
attitudes toward the two major sources of stimulation (source and topic) 
in a communication event, and (3) the position (pro or con) supported 
by the source's assertion about the topic. The rationale of these 
variables will be developed in Chapter III and they will be defined below, 
along with other pertinent terms used in this paper.
6Generally this study will partition the experimental audience into 
sixteen categories resulting from all possible combinations of the three 
major variables, i.e., (1) expectancy--recipients expecting a (a) favor­
able assertion or (b) an unfavorable assertion; (2) incongruency (or 
congruency)--resulting from attitudes measured prior to the communication 
event which are (a) favorable toward the source-favorable toward the 
topic, (b) favorable toward the source-unfavorable toward the topic,
(c) unfavorable toward the source-favorable toward the topic, or (d) uni- 
favorable toward the source and unfavorable toward the topic; and (3) the 
position supported by the assertion (4) favors the topic and (b) opposes 
the topic. Within and between the categories attitude change will be 
analyzed.
Definition of Terms
For purposes of clarity the most pertinent terms of this study will 
be theoretically defined and then operationally defined according to 
their use in this study.
Source. The source of an assertion is defined as the person to
whom the recipient attributes the assertion. In this study, each
assertion will be attributed to four different sources; therefore, the 
sources will be systematically manipulated by the experimenter.
Assertions. An assertion is defined as a message attributed to 
a source, which contains arguments and persuasive comments which are 
perceived by the recipient to either favor or oppose a given topic. In
this study, the assertions are operationally defined as tape recorded
messages identified as press releases.
Recipients. A recipient is defined as an individual who perceives
7an assertion. Recipients for this study are students who served as 
experimental subjects.
Expectancy. The concept of expectancy will be of major concern to 
this study and is defined generally as an individual's prediction of 
conditions that will exist in a forthcoming event. Within the framework 
of communication theory, expectancy is defined as a recipient's prediction 
of the position a given source will support in an assertion about a given 
topic. In other words, if President Johnson was scheduled to speak on 
the topic "communism," most citizens of the United States would expect 
him to oppose the topic.
Expectancy is operationalized in this study by an indication from 
each experimental subject, prior to the communication event, whether they 
expect a given source to favor or oppose a given topic.
Incongruity. Several research programs in communication theory 
have been based on the human tendency to resolve perceived conflict by 
some form of psychological compromise. While the theories differ from 
each other in terms of the theoretical constructs or systems which 
attempt to explain or provide rationale for the occurence of this 
phenomenon, all of the theories support the basic "strain toward symmetry" 
concept; that is to say, if the human organism perceives two objects or 
concepts which are in conflict, but which are related to each other in 
some meaningful fashion, the result of such perception is a psychological 
lessening of the conflict.
This lessening or resolution of psychological conflict has been 
assigned different terminology within different theoretical systems.
8Some of the terms assigned are "dissonance,"^ "imbalance,"^® "conflict,
and " i n c o n s i s t e n c y . "12 The authors of the various theories acknowledge
the similarities between their theory and the theories of other writers;
for example, Festinger states:
The notions introduced thus far are not entirely new; many 
similar ones have been suggested. It may be of value to 
mention two whose formulation is closest to my own. HéÊder, 
in an as yet unpublished manuscript /now in book form: The
Psychology of Interpersonal Relations /, discusses the relation­
ships among people and among sentiments. . . .  If one replaces 
the word 'balance' wi_th 'consonance' and 'imbalance' with 
'dissonance', . . . X^his work/ by Heider can be seen to indicate 
the same process with which our discussion up to now has 
dealt. . . . Osgood and Tannenbaum recently published a paper 
in which they also formulated and documented a similar idea 
with respect to changes in opinions and attitudes. . . . The 
particular kind of 'incongruity' or cognitive dissonance with 
which they deal in their study is produced by the knowledge that 
a person . . . supports an opinion which the subject regards 
negatively. . . . They proceed to show that under such 
circumstances there is a marked tendency to change either the 
evaluation of the opinion involved or the evaluation of the 
source in a direction which would reduce the dissonance.13
The similarity of basic concepts and the near synonymity of terms is
readily apparent in Festinger's writing. Also, in Osgood, Tannenbaum
and Suci's 1957 statement of their "congruity principle" they write:
The congruity principle appears to be a very general process 
operating whenever cognitive events interact. . . .  So far our
^Leon Festinger, A Theory of Cognitive Dissonance (Evanston, 111.: 
Row, Peterson and Company, 1957).
lOp. Heider, "Attitudes and Cognitive Organizations." Journal of 
Psychology. XXI (April, 1946), 107-112.
11t . Newcomb, "An Approach to the Study of the Communication 
Arts." Psychological Review. LX (1953), 393-408.
12prescott Lecky, Self Consistency: A Theory of Personality
(New York: Island Press, 1945).
l^Festinger, A Theory of Cognitive Dissonance, pp. 8-10.
experiments have dealt mainly with congruity phenomena as they 
occur in language behavior, in the attitude area, in word 
meanings and in the aesthetics area. But it seems likely to 
us that congruity will also apply to overt behavioral situations, 
e.g., to changes in the like-dislike structure of interacting 
groups (sociometry and group dynamics) and to the interactions 
between individuals and objects in their environment. Using 
notions very much like these, Festinger (in a forthcoming 
book) has done.many experiments in this behavioral area.
Newcomb (1953) has also utilized similar notions in his 
theoretical analysis of interpersonal communication. The earliest 
expression of ideas dealing with 'congruity' in human thinking, 
at least in contemporary psychology, may be found in a paper 
by Heider (1946).^^
Because the "incongruity" of Osgood, Tannenbaum and Suci is 
directly applied to communication (as stated in the citation above) and 
is defined within this context, the present study, rather than intro­
duce still another set of terms, will incorporate their system (with some 
refinement). The rationale for the congruity principle is based on 
Osgood, Tannenbaum and Suci's mediational response theory of meaning which 
is set forth at length in The Measurement of Meaning and will not be 
discussed here.^^ In defining incongruity within the context of 
communication, Osgood, Tannenbaum and Suci state that incongruity is 
perceived by a recipient when:
1. Favorable (or unfavorable) sources and topics are 
disassociated by a negative assertion linking them.
2. Oppositely evaluated signs (favorable source, unfavorable 
topic, or vice versa) are associated by a positive assertion.
These two incongruent situations are based on the general assumption
that :
^^Charles Osgood, Percy Tannenbaum and George Suci, The Measurement 
of Meaning (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1957), p. 216.
l^ibid.. pp. 1-30.
IGlbid.. p. 203.
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We expect sources we like to sponsor ideas we favor and denounce 
ideas we are against and vice v e r s a .
Their operational definition of incongruity, then, is any difference in 
a recipient's attitudinal positions for source and topic as measured by 
a pre-communication attitude test. It is at this point the pretest 
study will diverge from Osgood, Tannenbaum and Suci's operational defi­
nition of an incongruous situation.
Inherent in Osgood, Tannenbaum and Suci's theoretical definition 
of incongruity are the elements of "expectancy" and "opposing or 
conflicting pre-communication attitudes"; however, in their operational 
definition, one (pre-communication attitudes) is measured and the other 
(expectancy) is inferred from the measurement of the first. The present 
study, on the other hand, will measure both and, therefore, must define 
them separately.
The nature of expectancy is defined above under its own heading; 
however, expectancy may be either confirmed--the speaker supports the 
position the recipient expected him to--or it can be disconfirmed--the 
speaker does not support the position the recipient expected him to.
In the latter case, incongruity (consistent with Osgood, Tannenbaum and 
Suci's theoretical definition) is produced between the recipient's 
expectation of the speaker's position and the recipient's perception 
of the speaker's position. This source of incongruity will be called 
disconfirmed expectancy in this paper. In other words, if President 
Johnson was scheduled to speak on the topic of "communism," most United 
States citizens would expect him to oppose the topic; however, if
17lbid.
11
Johnson spoke in favor of communism an incongruous situation would exist.
A disconfirmed expectancy will be operationally defined in this 
study as existing when the recipient indicates an expectancy prior to 
hearing a communication that is in conflict with that same recipient's 
perception of the communication. Each recipient will indicate his 
expectancy of each communication situation prior to hearing the communica­
tion. Each recipient's perception of each assertion will be measured 
immediately following each communication.
The second source of incongruity results when a recipient holds 
conflicting attitudes toward the source and the topic of a communication. 
This conflict is operationally defined by situations in which a recipient's 
attitude toward the source is favorable and his attitude toward the topic 
is unfavorable, or vice versa. The conflict produced by opposing source- 
topic attitudes will be called "incongruity" in the same fashion that 
Osgood, Tannenbaum and Suci use thetfcerm to describe the phenomenon in 
their "adjective-noun" study (this study is discussed in Chapter II).
Position supported by the assertion. The position supported by 
the source in his assertion about a topic can generally be defined in 
terms of "favor" or "oppose," i.e., the source is either in favor of or 
opposed to a topic. The topics in this study are: (1) A proposal to
finance medical care for the aged by increasing social security assess­
ments, (2) A treaty between Russia and the United States banning under­
ground nuclear testing, (3) A voluntary boycott in America of British- 
made products to discourage Britain from selling goods to Cuba, and (4)
The Supreme Court ruling which bans prayeriin the public schools. If 
the source's assertion is perceived to favor a treaty with Russia, a
12
proposal to finance medical care, etc., it will be operationally defined 
as favoring the topic. Conversely, if the assertion is perceived to 
oppose a treaty with Russia, etc., it will be operationally defined as 
opposing the topic.
The author of the assertions to be used in this study (the 
experimenter) had an intended direction in mind when each assertion was 
written; however, studies such as the Cooper and Jahoda study indicate 
that the intended direction is not always the perceived direction, ice., 
as perceived by the r e c i p i e n t . 18 T q  guard against such possible mis­
perceptions, each experimental recipient will indicate the direction he 
perceived the assertion to favor immediately following his exposure to 
the assertion. If the perceived direction of the assertion is the same 
as the intended direction, the conditions for defining the position 
supported by the assertion will have been satisfied.
Preattitudes of the recipient toward the source and topic of the 
communication. Throughout this study the terms "preattitude" and "post­
attitude" will be used. Preattitudes will be defined as the attitudes 
held by recipients prior to hearing the communication. Postattitudes 
are the attitudes the recipient: holds after hearing the communication. 
Both preattitudes and postattitudes will be operationally defined by a 
recipient's score on the semantic differential test of attitude admini­
stered before and after the communication, respectively. The semantic 
differential attitude test is discussed more fully in Chapter IV.
l^Eunice Cooper and Marie Jahoda, "The Evasion of Propaganda," 
Journal of Psychology. XXIII (1947), 15-25. Also see: Muzafer Sherif
and Carl Hoviand. Social Judgment (New Haven: Yale University Press,
1961), p. 149.
13
Attitude Change. Attitude change in this study will be deter­
mined in the fashion prescribed and used by Osgood, Tannenbaum and Suci.^^ 
Each individual recipient's postattitude score on the semantic differ­
ential will be subtracted from his preattitude score. For ease of 
reference in this study, the difference between postattitude score 
and preattitude score for each individual will be called an "I-score" 
(individual score). Also, in this study, the difference between the 
experimental categories, each of which contain several individual reci­
pients, will be used in the analysis; therefore, when categories are 
compared, the data used will consist of the mean of the I-scores in each 
category. The difference between the mean I-score in two different 
categories will be called a "C-score" (category score). Both in the case 
of individual attitude changes (I-scores) and of differences between two 
categories (C-scores), the sign (+) which accompanies the scores will 
indicate the direction of the change--the minus sign (-) indicating a 
a change in attitude toward the "dislike" dimension, the plus sign (+) 
indicating a change in attitude toward the "like" dimension.
l^Osgood, Tannenbaum and Suci, The Measurement of Meaning, p. 212.
CHAPTER II 
REVIEW OF RELEVANT RESEARCH
Theories dealing with inconsistencies in perceptual fields are 
certainly not new to psychological research. A large body of research 
has either implicitly or explicitly indicated that individuals strive 
for perceptual internal consistency; however, most of research relevant 
to communication theory has occurred during the last two decades. As 
mentioned in Chapter I, a focal point of research relevant to this 
study is found in the studies of Heider,^ Newcomb,^ Festinger,3 
Tannenbaum,4 and Bettinghaus.5 The studies cited here deal more expli­
citly with communication than studies of general perceptual inconsis­
tencies.&
The first of these studies and one which provided a basis for
^Heider, Journal of Psychology, XXI, 107-112.
ZNewcomb, Psychological Review, LX, 393-408.
^Festinger, A Theory of Cognitive Dissonance.
^Osgood, Tannenbaum and Suci, The Measurement of Meaning.
^Erwin Bettinghaus, "The Operation of Congruity in an Oral 
Communication Situation." Speech Monographs XXVIII (August, 1961), 
131-142.
^Such as Gestalt psychology.
14
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most of the others was Heider's logically derived analysis of cognitive 
relations in 1946.7 Using a simple form of symbolic logic, Heider 
formulated relational structures for first two, then three cognitive 
elements within a single context. Following each logical formulation, 
he subjected his hypotheses to several example situations to illustrate 
their "goodness of fit." The hypotheses he derives are: (1) in the
case of two entities a balanced state exists if the relation between 
them is positive (or negative) in all respects, i.e., if the element 
linking the two entities is always either good or bad, positive or
negative, etc., in all situations where the two entities appear together,
and (2) in the case of three entities, a balanced state exists if all 
three relations are positive in all respects, or if two are negative 
and one positive.®
The two hypotheses can be graphically illustrated as follows:
I. II.
a. — (+)— ► B  a. A«^ ■- (+) — >  B
^+) (+)
b. A ^ — (-)— ► B  ^  /
C
b. A-#—  (+)— »"B 
\  /
( - )  ( - )
It should be noted that the positive and negative signs used in the 
illustrations above substitute for verbs in Heider's original logical 
versions. For example, if (+) represents "love," it must also be
^Heider, Journal of Psychology. XXI, 102-112.
®Ibid.. p. 110.
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functional for "admire," "like," "esteem," etc., and it must be reciprocal
(i.e., A "loves" B; B "loves" A) or the relation may not be made. Heider
summarizes his analysis.
An examination of the discussed examples suggests the conclusion 
that a good deal of inter-personal behavior and social perception 
is determined--or at least co-determined--by simple configurations.
. . . However, the understandable human behavior often is not of 
this sort _/complex and sterile psychological theory based on 
empirical studied, but is based on the simple configurations. . . . 
Since they /simple configuration// determine both behavior and 
perception we can understand social behavior of this kind.9
It should be noted before progressing that Heider's construct is
relatively passive, i.e., he does not consider the possibility of his
linking elements undergoing change through communication; however, he
does recognize the forces which are created by an incongruous situation:
Summarizing this preliminary discussion of balance, or harmonious, 
states, we can say that they are states characterized by two or 
more relations which fit together. If no balanced state exists, 
then forces toward the /balancej^ state will arise. Either there 
will be a tendency to change the sentiments involved, or the unit 
relations will be changed through action or cognitive reorganization. 
If a change is not possible, the state of imbalance will produce 
tension, and the balanced states will be preferred over the 
states of imbalance.10
Although Heider's formulations and methods were admittedly rough, his
theory was instrumental in encouraging continued study of psychological
conflicts.
In 1953, Newcomb advanced a more sophisticated and empirically 
supported discussion of the relations suggested by H e i d e r . U t i l i z i n g
^Ibid., p. 111.
lOpritz Heider, unpublished manuscript cited in Festinger's 
Cognitive Dissonance, p. 121.
llNewcomb, Psychological Review, LX, 393-408.
17
12 13the group communication research of Festinger and Thibaut, Back, 
and Schachter,^^ Newcomb reinterpreted their data in terms of Heider's 
principles. However, Newcomb couched the principles in a communication 
situation, thereby overcoming the passive qualities of Heider's original 
hypotheses. A graphic schematic of Newcomb's reformulation is presented 
below, where A and B are communicating by means of assertion X.
A 11^
\./
X
Newcomb states:
The foregoing propositions represent only a slight extrapolation of 
Heider's general principle of 'balanced states' in the absence of 
which unit relations will be changed through 'action or through
cognitive reorganization.'15
The similarity between Heider and Newcomb's models is readily 
apparent. However, by placing his model in a communication situation 
and making the third element the communicative assertion, Newcomb provides 
a means by which the cognitive elemehts may be changed by communication. 
Also, the observable nature of the communication (X) provides a convenient 
and observable phenomenon from which the cognitive structures of A and B 
can be inferred. In Newcomb's model a higher degree of symmetry among 
the elements can be obtained due to the increased flexibility provided
l^L. Festinger and J. Thibaut, "Interpersonal Communications in 
Small Groups." Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology. XLVI (1951), 
92-99.
Back, "The Exertion of Influence Through Social Communication," 
Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology. XLVI (1951), 9-23.
14g. Schachter, "Deviation, Rejection, and Communication." Journal 
of Abnormal and Social Psychology. XLVI (1951), 92-99.
^^Newcomb, Psychological Review, LX, 399.
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by a communication channel. A and B can resolve any incongruity and, 
in addition, could potentially attain similar intensities of attitudes.
Newcomb continues the application of this construct through a
small group situation which results in his conclusions:
Communicative acts are distinctive in that they may be aroused by > 
and may result in changes anywhere within the system of relations 
between two or more communicators and the objects of their communi­
cations. It seems likely that the dynamics of such a system are 
such that from an adequate understanding of its properties at a 
given moment there can be predicted both the likelihood of occurrence 
of a given act of communication and the nature of changes in those 
properties which will result from that act,^^
Newcomb's conclusion has broad implications concerning the 
applicability of an incongruity theory to communication. He suggests that 
the communication itself can be predicted as well as the results that 
communication has upon a recipient.
The research and theories of Heider, Newcomb and others whose 
research has led them to formulate theories concerned with states of 
incongruity were incorporated by Festinger in. a theory of "cognitive 
dissonance." Festinger defines "dissonance" as "the existence of non­
fitting relations among cognitions" which is "a motivating factor in its 
own right." "Cognition" is defined as any "knowledge, opinion, or belief 
about the environment, about oneself, or about one's behavior."
Cognitive dissonance, then, is defined as "an antecedent condition which 
leads to activity oriented toward dissonance reduction just as hunger 
leads to activity oriented toward hunger reduction.
IGlbid.. p. 403.
l^Festinger, A Theory of Cognitive Dissonance, pp. 3ff.
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If a logical chronology of theory was the purpose of this review, 
Festinger's theory would, also, be considered as a direct extension of 
Heider's formulation.
Festinger's purpose was to generate an explicit, yet broadly 
generalizable theory that could find valid application in all areas of 
perception. In his words, "The task we are attempting is to formulate 
the theory of dissonance in a precise yet generally applicable form, to 
draw out is implication to a variety of contexts, and to present data 
relevant to the t h e o r y . "^8 Unlike Newcomb's theory, Festinger does not 
restrict his handling of dissonance to communication situations; rather, 
he attempts to include all types of dissonant situations.
Cognitive dissonance, according to Festinger, concerns itself 
with the conditions that arouse nonfitting relations in the perceptual 
field of an individual and the ways in which that dissonance can be reduced. 
The psychological strain created by the dissonance is toward consonance,
i.e., a lessening of the conflict. The units of the theory are cognitive 
elements and the relationship between them. He defines cognitive 
elements as:
. . . elements ^w^ich/ refer to what has been called cognition, that 
is, the things a person knows about himself, about his behavior, and 
about his surroundings. These elements, then, are 'knowledges,' if 
I may coin the plural form of the word. . . .  It is clear that the 
term 'knowledge' has been used to include things to which the word 
does not ordinarily refer--for example, opinions. A person does not 
hold an opinion unless he thinks it is correct, and so, psychologically, 
it is not different from a 'knowledge.' The same is true of beliefs, 
values, or attitudes, which function as 'knowledges' for our purposes.19
I S l b i d . . p. 9.
19lbid.. p. 10.
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His definition of "knowledge" would, of course, include expectancy.
The three methods of dissonance reduction given above are appli­
cable to a wide range of situations. Festinger applies these methods to 
several actual situations, two of which are of particular interest to 
communication situations. He writes:
1. Dissonance introduced by disagreement expressed by other 
persons may be reduced by changing one's own opinion, by influencing 
others to change their opinion, and by rejecting those who diagree.
2. Influence exerted on a person will be more effective in 
producing opinion change to the extent that the indicated change of 
opinion reduces dissonance for that p e r s o n .
The two applications of dissonance theory to communication illustrate the
general nature of source and topic interaction within Festinger's theory.
A fourth major theoretical formulation of perceived incongruities 
grew out of the efforts of Tannenbaum.^l His research deals directly 
with the "conflict" a recipient perceives in a communication situation. 
Also, with Osgood and Suci, Tannenbaum developed an attitude measuring 
device which lends itself to measuring attitude change in communication 
(or other) situations.^2
Note that the theories of Festinger and Tannenbaum, et al., were 
developed almost simultaneously and exclusively. The slight effect one
ZOpestinger, A Theory of Cognitive Dissonance, p. 256.
^^The original work on congruity in communication is found in 
Percy Tannenbaum, "Initial Attitude Toward Source and Concept as Factors 
in Attitude Change through Communication," (unpublished Ph.D. disserta­
tion, University of Illinois, 1953). Refinements of the theory are: 
Charles Osgood and Percy Tannenbaum, "The Principles of Congruity in the 
Prediction of Attitude Chapge," Psychological Review. LXII (1955), 42; 
Percy Tannenbaum, "Initial Attitude Toward Source and Concept as Factors 
in Attitude Change Through Communication," Public Opinion Quarterly. XX 
(1956), 413; and Osgood, Tannenbaum and Suci, The Measurement of Meaning.
^^Osgood, Tannenbaum and Suci, The Measurement of Meaning.
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theory had on the other is reflected by each authors' in passing refer­
ence to a "forthcoming book" by the other. The basic difference in 
the theories is that Festinger's theory is formulated generally and then 
empirically tested in several categories of behavioral responses (choice, 
decision, forced compliance, etc.,), while Osgood, Tannenbaum and Suci's 
theory grows out of their concern with semantics (word meaning) and 
attitude change.
One of the major contributions of Tannenbaum's congruity principle 
is his definition of incongruity in a communication situation. He chose 
the major sources of stimulation (source and topic) in a communication 
as elements most likely to account for most incongruity in communications. 
The "field," "ground," or "link," which unites the source of stimulation 
in the perceptual field of the recipient is called an assertion. Assertion 
is defined only by examples of communication s i t u a t i o n s . I n  the examples, 
assertions vary from brief headlines to complete newspaper articles.
According to Osgood, Tannenbaum and Suci, congruity is perceived 
by the recipient when:
1. Favorable (or unfavorable) sources and topics are disassociated 
by a negative assertion linking them;
2. Oppositely evaluated signs (favorable source, unfavorable 
topic, or vice versa) are associated by a positive a s s e r t i o n . 25
The two hypotheses are based on the assumption:
We expect sources we like to sponsor ideas we favor and denounce 
ideas we are against and vice ve r s a .26
23ibid. 
24lbid.. p. 202.
25Ibid.. p. 203.
Z^Ibid.
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Tannenbaum tested these hypotheses in a written communications 
situation. The experimental situation consisted of a newspaper article 
in which certain sources asserted favorably or unfavorably on certain 
topics. The criterion measure for attitude change was the semantic 
differential and the results supported the predictions almost perfectly. 
Owing to the accuracy with which the data supported the predictions, 
Tannenbaum posits a model of attitude change in communication.27 The 
model is summarized in Figure 1.
Hoping to extend Tannenbaum's congruity principle to oral communi­
cations situations, Bettinghaus conducted a study uâing "live" speakers 
in a face-to-face communication.28 in addition to attitude measures of 
source and topic, Bettinghaus included the audience's estimate of the 
speaker's delivery, and an index of the relative intensity of the asser­
tion, i.e., a "weak" and a "strong" assertion about each topic. The 
study was based on the general hypothesis that "listeners will tend to 
balance their attitudes toward the /tota^ elements of the oral communi­
cation situation." Adopting the basic assumption of Tannenbaum, 
Bettinghaus bases his hypothesis on the assumption:
Incongruity, or what Festinger calls dissonance, actually involves 
'a violation of expectations.' Listeners expect favored sources to 
support concepts which they favor. They expect disliked sources to 
support concepts which they dislike. When a favored source supports 
a disliked concept, a violation of expectation takes place, and 
incongruity is produced.30
27rannenbaum, unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, p. 58.
28settinghaus, Speech Monographs XXVIII, 131-142.
29lbid., p. 133.
30ibid.
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FIGURE I
TANNENBAUM'S PREDICTIVE MODEL AND RESULTS OBTAINED
Preattitudes Predicted Direction Obtained
of Recipients of Change on Change on&
Source Topic Source Topic Source Topic
Positive Assertions
+ + + + 25 51
o + + + 150 39
- + + - 49 -24
+ o o + 16 245
o o o + 25 80
- o o - 13 -52
+ + -42 107
o - - + -94 48
- - - - - 7 -10
Negative Assertions
+ + _ _ -45 -88
o + - - - 68 -72
- + - + -33 19
+ o o _ 1 -180
o o o - 17 -79
- o o + - 3 22
+ + _ 34 -39
0 - + - 96 -34
- - + + 34 16
+ = Favorable attitude or attitude change.
o = "Neutral" attitude or no attitude change.
- = Unfavorable attitude or attitude change.
^Numbers represent the total change score for 45 subj ects (each
subject has a possible change score of 36 which yields a possible total
change score of 1620).
Source: Tannenbaum, unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, p. 58
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Generally, Bettinghaus' results in the oral communication situa­
tion did not support the predictions of Tannenbaum's written communication 
model (see Figure 2). In many cases, Bettinghaus' results were in direct 
contradiction to Tannenbaum's predictions. The general theory of con­
gruity (i.e., dissimilar elements tend to move toward congruity) was 
tentatively supported by Bettinghaus.
The conclusions Bettinghaus tentatively drew from his data are:
1. The experimental subjects did tend to shift their attitudes 
toward the speaker and the speech topic to more congruous positions.
2. The shift toward congruity in the oral communication situa­
tion seems to be determined more by the listener's attitude toward 
the speaker than by the listener's attitude toward the speech topic.
3. The listener tends to balance the impression he received 
from the speaker's delivery with his impressions of the speaker. 
Specifically the listener's attitude toward the speaker's delivery 
is made congruous with his attitude toward the speaker as a 
function of initial attitude toward the speaker and of perceived 
effectiveness in speaker delivery.
4. Attitude toward the treatment of the speech topic is not 
shown as significant in determining the listener's attitude toward 
the speech topic. Differences between 'strong' and 'weak' speech 
treatment are not shown to have significant effects in determining 
the listener's final attitude toward the speech topic.31
On the basis of his results, Bettinghaus also constructs a model for pre­
dicting attitude change. The model's prerequisites include preattitudes 
toward both source and topic and a measure of attitude shift toward the 
source. Given these three factors, the model is about 80 percent effi­
cient in predicting the direction of attitude shift toward the t o p i c . 32 
Bettinghaus' model is reproduced in Figure 3.
One possible affective factor in Bettinghaus' research was the 
use of relatively unknown speakers. The preattitude toward the source
31lbid.. p. 142.
3^Ibid., p. 141.
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FIGURE 2 
RESULTS OF BETTINGHAUS STUDY
Preattitudes 
of Audience
Predicted
Change
(Tannenbaum)
Obtained Percentage of
Change Correct
(Bettinghaus) Predictions*
(From Bettinghaus)
Source Topic Source Topic Source Topic Source. Topic
Positive Assertions
+ + + + .245 .410
+ o o + - - — — - .729
+ - - + - + .727 .889
o + + + + _ .676 .270
o 0 o + + + — — - .710
0 - - + - + .333 .889
_ + + + .333 1.000
+ o 0 4- - - — — - 0.000
- - - - ’+ + .400 .400
Negative Assertions
+ + _ _ _ _ .542 .729
+ o o - - + -- .500
+ - + - - + .351 .270
0 + - _ _ + .351 .270
o o 0 - + + — — — .403
o - + - + + . 666 .250
+ + + .286 .214
- o o + + - — “ — .428
- - + + + + 1.000 1.000
+ = Indicates a favorable attitude or attitude change
- = Indicates an opposing attitude or attitude change •
o = Indicates a neutral attitude.
^Numbers are decimal fractions indicating the number of subjects 
in each category whose attitude changed in the predicted direction (based 
on Tannenbaum's model).
Source: Bettinghaus, Speech Monographs. XXVIII, 133.
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FIGURE 3
PREDICTIVE MODEL OF ATTITUDE CHANGE PROPOSED BY BETTINGHAUS^
Original If Speaker
With Positive 
Assertions Topic
With Negative 
Assertions Topic
Attitudes shift is Shift will be Shift will be
+ +
S+T-f o 4- -
- - 4-
+ + _
S+To o 4- -
- - 4-
-K 4-
S-tT- o 4- -
- - 4-
+ 4- _
SoT+ o 4- -
- - 4-
+ 4-
SoTo o 4- -
- - 4-
-f- 4- _
SoT- o 4- -
- - 4-
4- 4-
S-T+ o - 4-
- - 4-
+ 4- -
S-To o 4- -
- - 4-
+ 4- _
S-T- o - -
4-
®This model accurately accounted for 77.5% of 160 individual atti­
tude change measures made in the Bettinghaus study.
Source: Bettinghaus, Speech Monographs, XXVIII, 141.
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was based on a brief one-exposure introduction of the speaker to the 
audience. It is doubtful that the attitudes formed during that brief 
introduction were very stable (see conclusion number 2 above).
Bettinghaus reports that the greatest change in the recipient's 
attitudes was toward the source, while Tannenbaum found the greatest 
change toward the topic. The explanation offered by both authors was 
that the greatest source of stimulation was the source or the topic, 
respectively, in the two studies. Because the studies differed in the 
type of communication situation involved (oral and written), this 
explanation has some face validity.
As mentioned earlier in this discussion, both Tannenbaum and 
Bettinghaus base their concept of congruity on the assumption that "we 
expect sources we like to sponsor ideas we favor and denounce ideas we 
are"against, and vice versa." In light of the examples they offer to 
support this assumption, it seems to have great face validity. As a 
result of this assumption, the writers infer the expectancy of each 
recipient from indices of the recipient's preattitudes. Closer scrutiny 
of this assumption reveals a possible validity problem in the two 
studies, i.e., possibly they are not measuring the expectancy variable 
as they purport.
A single example can adequately illustrate the obvious nature 
of this validity problem. A person (recipient) might like the preacher 
of his local parish (source) and he might also like alcoholic beverages 
(topic); however, its doubtful he would expect the preacher to preach 
in favor of alcoholic drinks. Placing this example within the procedures 
and basic assumptions of Tannenbaum and Bettinghaus' studies, the measure
28
of the recipient's attitude toward the source and the topic would indi­
cate that the recipient was favorable toward both the preacher (source) 
and alcoholic beverages (topic). The basic assumption that "we expect 
sources we like to support topics we favor, etc." subscribed to by both 
Tannenbaum and Bettinghaus, would predict that the recipient would expect 
the preacher to speak in favor of alcoholic beverages. This same criticism 
would be extended into other combinations of favorable and unfavorable 
attitudes toward sources and topics. It should also be noted that the 
example given above is not an unlikely occurrence--preachers often preach 
on alcoholic intake to recipients who drink. Rarely is the assertion 
favorable.
To test the validity of this logical observation, a pilot study
was conducted in which a group of twenty-seven students were asked to
33register their attitudes toward four sources and foui; topics. The
semantic differential was used as an attitude measuring instrument and
was composed of the scales that Bettinghaus and Tannenbaum had used in
their studies. Also, the same procedure for administering the semantic
differential used by Tannenbaum and Bettinghaus was used in this pilot
study. Two days after indicating their attitudes toward the sources and
topics, the subjects were asked to indicate their expectation of sixteen
possible communication events. The communication events were simulated
by placing all possible combinations of the sources and topics into the
following instrument:
The position on the scale I would expect (source) to support 
when speaking on (topic) is:
Resume and statistical computations of this study are reported 
in Appendix A.
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Favor :____ :____ :____ :____ :_____:____ Oppose
The experimental recipients were divided according to their scores 
on the attitude test into the categories of: (1) favorable toward source-
favorable toward topic; (2) favorable toward source-unfavorable toward 
topic, (3) unfavorable toward source-favorable toward topic, and (4) 
unfavorable toward source-unfavorable toward topic. The results of the 
study indicate that over 30 percent of the time, the assumption that 
"we expect sources we like to support topics we like," which forms the 
basis of Tannenbaum and Bettinghaus' studies, was not accurate in 
predicting the expectancy the experimental subjects registered on the 
expectancy scale. In other words, the expectancy of the subjects could 
not be reliably predicted from a measure of their preattitudes.
The results of this pilot study coupled with the congruity 
principle's reliance upon a violation of expectations suggests a more 
thorough investigation of the effects actual expectancy has on a communi­
cation situation. Actual expectancy is here defined as the expectancy 
experienced by a person confronted with a specific situation. This 
variable becomes increasingly important in communication situations 
where the source is as likely to support one position as another. To 
cite an example, politicians often seem to chose the position on con­
troversial questions that will provide the widest approval of their 
choice, thus winning the politician the most possible votes. Similarly 
different recipients have different reasons for expecting a source to 
support a particular topic. To cite a more specific example. President 
Kennedy was faced with taking a position on a "federal aid to parochial 
schools" issue. Many persons decided that since Kennedy was Catholic,
30
and that the largest portion of parochial schools were operated by the 
Catholic religion, that he (Kennedy) would "naturally" favor the use of 
federal aid to the parochial schools. This expectation was not necessarily 
limited to persons who happened to have a proper (in the congruity theory 
sense) combination of attitudes toward Kennedy and parochial schools.
Other persons were just as likely to have different reasons for their 
expectancies of Kennedy in this situation, e.g., "he'll lose a good per­
centage of the Protestant vote if he favors the federal aid," or 
"Catholic or not, federal aid to parochial schools is bad business and I 
think that Kennedy, even though he is a Democrat, can see that it is 
wrong."
The examples cited above illustrate the potential for expectancies 
that are divorced from a recipient's attitudes toward a given source or 
topic. Logically, then, if incongruity is contingent upon expectancy or 
on a violation of expectancies, a primary consideration would be the 
determination of actual expectancy violations. As Brehm and Cohen have 
stated it, "taking account of the individual's expectancy is necessary 
in order to determine what is inconsistent with what.
Expectancy, as it has been discussed above and within the confines 
of the congruity principle, is defined as an expectation a recipient 
has of a source's assertion. Such a definition is perhaps adequate for 
further investigation of expectancy within this context; however, much 
can be learned from a broader concept of expectancy that enjoys recurring 
popularity in psychological research. The discussion of expectancy in 
terms of incongruity, above, represents a focal point to which the
^^Jack W. Brehm and Arthur R. Cohen, Explorations in Cognitive 
Dissonance (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1962), p. 178.
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following discussion of a more "general expectancy" will return^S after 
searching out other areas of research that might provide a better 
understanding of the expectancy concept.
A body of research evidence applicable to a type of expectancy 
(i.e., "self" expectancy) was conducted in the late 1930's and early 
1940's under the generic term "aspiration level." Various types of 
studies contributing to this area were conducted by Lewin, et al., 
Hilgard, et al. Frank,38 Anderson and Brandt, Chapman  and Volkmann, 
Whyte,Festinger,42 and others. Generally, the results indicated that 
an individual's behavior seemed to be affected by his expectancy in cer­
tain situations (especially groups situations'^); however, the results 
were ungeneralizable and inconclusive.
^^The "focal point" will again be reached in the Ewing study 
discussed in the final pages of this chapter.
T. Lewin, et al., "Level of Aspiration," Personality and 
the Behavior Disorders, ed. J. McV. Hunt (New York: Ronald Press, 1944),
p. 333.
R. Hilgard, et al., "Level of Aspiration," Journal of 
Experimental Psychology. XXVII (1939), 411.
38j. D. Frank, "Individual Differences in Certain Aspects of the 
Level of Aspiration." American Journal of Psychology. LXVII (1935), 119.
Anderson and J. Brandt, "Fifth Grade Children and Level of 
Aspiration," Journal of Social Psychology. X (1939), 209.
40d . W. Chapman and J. A. Volkmann, "A Social Determinant of 
Levels of Aspiration." Journal of Abnormal Psychology. XXIV (1939), 209.
41William F. Whyte, Street Corner Society (Chicago: University
of Chicago Press, 1943).
4%L. Festinger, "A Theoretical Interpretation of Shifts of 
Level of Aspiration," Psychological Review. XLIX (1942), 235.
43wuzafer Sherif and Carolyn Sherif, An Outline of Social 
Psychology (rev. ed.; New York: Harper and Brothers, 1956), p. 302.
40
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A. second area of research--a bit closer to the problem--ls the 
large body of "credibility" and "prestige" studies. Moos and Koslin,^^ 
Lurie,Haiman,46 Paulson,47 Hovland and his associates,48 and others 
have suggested or shown that sources who are assigned differing degrees 
or kinds of status by a recipient are more or less effective in changing 
attitudes of that recipient. Stating these findings in terms of a reci­
pient's expectancy, it might be suggested that the varying degrees of 
attitude change are a consequence of varying degrees of recipient 
expectancy. Sources high on a credibility index are probably expected 
to be more knowledgable, trustworthy, etc. Moreover, the assertions 
attributed to high credibility sources are probably expected to be 
more persuasive, more truthful, etc. This interpretation of aspiration 
and credibility, of course, goes beyond the existing evidence.
Two early theories which are more direct in handling expectancy 
were published by Tinklepaugh^^ and Lecky.^® The earliest study, by
44m. Moos and B. Koslin, "Prestige Suggestion and Political 
Leadership." Public Opinion Quarterly. XVI (1952), 77.
Lurie, "Tt)e Measurement of Prestige and Prestige-Suggesti- 
bilitv." Journal of Social Psychology. IX (1938), 278-284.
Haiman, "An Experimental Study of the Effects of Ethos on 
Public Speaking," Speech Monographs. XVI (June, 1949), 190-202.
^^Sw Paulson, "The Effects of the Prestige of Speaker and Acknow­
ledgment of Opposing Arguments on Audience Retention and Shift of 
Opinion." Speech Monographs. XXI (November, 1954), 267-271.
48a  majority of the studies referred to are summarized in Perfla- 
sion and Personality by Hovland Knd Janis. Also see: K. Anderson and T.
Clevenger, "A Summary of Experimental Research in Ethos." Speech 
Monographs. XXX (June, 1963), 59.
^^0. Tinklepaugh, "An Experimental Study of Representative Factors 
in Monkeys," Journal of Comparative Psychology. VIII (1928), 197.
^^Prescott Lecky, Self Consistency. A Theory of Personality (New 
York: Island Press, 1945).
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Tinklepaugh, was based on the theory that a deviation from a habitual 
task would cause "disappointment." Using monkeys as subjects, Tinklepaugh's 
results were only partially supported--monkeys that were accustomed to 
finding bananas under their feeding plates were "disappointed" when 
lettuce was substituted for bananas; however, the monkeys conditioned to 
expect lettuce were not disappointed, but pleased to find bananas.
Lecky's theory was a bit more sophisticated, but offered little 
concrete data to support his theory of "consistency" and "expectation" 
based on personality traits. However, Lecky's theory accurately pre­
dicts the results obtained by Aronson and Carlsmith almost twenty years 
later.51
The series of studies conducted by Aronson and Carlsmith were based 
on Festinger's dissonance theory and dealt explicitly with expectancy.
The results of their studies indicate definite relations between 
expectancy and behavior.
In the first study of the series, Aronson and Carlsmith created
situations of expectancy by having subjects judge several sets of 
52pictures. Each subject judged 100 sets of three pictures each. They 
were told that one of the three photographs in each set was of a hospi­
talized schizophrenic and that the test was designed to measure their 
ability to "pick" the schizophrenic. The 100 individual judgment tasks 
were divided into five sessions of 20 judgments each. By false feedback 
during the first four sessions, half the subjects were led to believe that
51e. Aronson and J. Carlsmith, "Performance Expectancy as a 
Determinant of Actual Performance." Journal of Abnormal and Social 
Psychology. IXV (September, 1962), 178rl87.
52lbid.. p. 178.
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they had scored consistently high--the other half were led to believe 
they had scored consistently low. Therefore, at the beginning of the 
fifth session, half the subjects expected to score high while the other 
half expected to score low. Following the fifth session, half the sub­
jects in each condition had their expectancies confirmed by false feed- 
back--half had their expectancies disconfirmed. Then, under a pretext, 
the experimenter allowed the subjects to judge the fifth set again. The 
dependent variable was the number of judgments made on the "repeated" 
trial that differed from the judgments made on the original trial.
Results indicate that subjects whose expectancy was disconfirmed in the 
first experimental condition changed significantly more of their judg­
ments in the second experimental condition. The conclusion drawn was 
that those subjects whose expectancies are confirmed are content with 
their score, while those whose expectancies are disconfirmed change 
their responses in an attempt to re-establish a consistent self-concept 
regarding their performance.
A second study by Carlsmith and Aronson created a psychological
53situation which pitted expectancy against perception of taste. Two 
liquids, one sweet and one bitter, were given to subjects in such a 
fashion as to create an expectancy of one or the other. The results 
generally support the conclusions that when the subject was expecting a 
sweet liquid but received the bitter liquid, his judgment was that the 
bitter liquid he received was "less bitter" or "sweeter" than the other 
bitter liquids he had sampled. Both liquids used in the study were
53
J. Carlsmith and E. Aronson, "Some Hedonic Consequences of the 
Confirmation or Disconfirmation of Expectancies," Journal of Abnormal and 
Social Psychology. LXVI (January, 1963), 151.
35
uniformly bitter or sweet. In all cases the judgment had moved in the 
direction of the expectancy.
A third experiment conducted by Aronson, Carlsmith and Darley in­
volved the use of subjects to make judgments of small weights and bitter 
l i q u i d s . Two groups of subjects were used. One of the groups was 
asked to make a series of judgments using weights (neutral task), the 
other group judged bitter liquids (unpleasant task). After both groups 
completed the "test" with their respective tasks, they were informed that 
"something had gone wrong" and that they would have to make the judgment 
tasks again. The second time each subject was asked to make judgments, 
he was given a choice of judging weights or bitter liquids. Results show 
that 100 percent of the subjects who had originally judged weights chose 
to do so again. A significant number of the subjects that had tasted 
bitter liquids also, chose to repeat their task despite the unpleasantness 
of the situation. The authors attribute the persistence of choice to the 
intensity of expectancy.
A final study to be considered was conducted by Ewing in 1942 
which has considerable influence on the hypothesis to be posited by the 
present s t u d y . Ewing's study was relatively unsophisticated according 
to present standards of measurement and quantification but his results 
are sufficiently obvious to merit consideration.
Ewing established situations of "unfavorable expectancy" and
5^E. Aronson, J. Carlsmith and J. Darley, "The Effects of Expectancy 
on Volunteering for an Unpleasant Experience," Journal of Abnormal and 
Social Psychology. LXVI (March, 1963), 220.
55%. Ewing, "A Study of Certain Factors Involved in Changes of 
Opinion." Journal of Social Psychology. XVI (1942), 63-88.
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"favorable expectancy" by using introductory material which led the 
experimental audiences to "expect" favorable or unfavorable communica­
tions about the Ford Motor Company. The communication, which the subjects 
read, was the same for both audiences and was highly unfavorable to the 
Ford Company. The first introduction, "Numerous people have pointed out 
that Ford represents 'Big Business' at its worst; however, some of the 
following facts hardly justify this v i e w , w a s  designed to cause the 
audience to expect an assertion that was favorable to the Ford Company.
The second introduction, "Numerous people have pointed out that Ford 
represents 'Big Business' at its best; however, some of the following 
facts hardly justify this view," was designed to create an expectation 
of an unfavorable assertion. Both groups of subjects' original "opinions" 
were generally favorable toward the Ford Company and both groups read the 
same unfavorable assertion. Results indicated that the group whose 
expectancy was confirmed changed their opinions significantly more in 
the direction advocated by the assertion than those whose expectancy was 
disconfirmed.
The general conclusion fco h’e drawn frOm the expectancy studies cited 
above is that expectancy when it exists in a given situation does influ­
ence perception, resultant behavior, and "opinion change." All authors 
are careful to point out that the generalizability of conclusions is 
limited to situations which follow adequate training or orienting 
periods, or situations in which expectancies might be assumed.
Applying this principle to a communicative situation, it would
S^lbid.. p. 80.
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be necessary to assume each subject's knowledge of the elements of the 
communication (i.e., source and topic) is sufficient to cause an expec­
tancy to be formulated. In other words, a communication involving "Joe 
Doakes" speaking on "table scraps" would probably not generate a 
sufficient expectancy for most recipients to influence them significantly.
CHAPTER III
THE RATIONALE FOR THE STUDY
The literature reviewed in the preceding chapter has summarized 
the potential effect of expectancy and incongruity on behavior and 
attitude change. Both of these experimental concepts appear to be 
"powerful" variables, i.e., they account for major adjustments of 
behavior or attitude in the situations in which they are studied.
The studies of Tannenbaum and Bettinghaus comprise most of the 
research in which source and topic are selected as the major sources of 
stimulation. Both studies combine expectancy and incongruity into a 
single variable. Situations of incongruity are defined by various com­
binations of pre-communication attitudes and by the authors' inference 
of where expectancy will be "violated."
Both Tannenbaum and Bettinghaus' studies used essentially the 
same procedure and methodology; however, their results are obviously con­
tradictory (see Figure 2). An attempt to account for the differences in 
their results according to the differences in the medium used by each 
study (Tannenbaum's was written, Bettinghaus' was oral communication) 
does not seem wholly adequate. Neither does it seem likely that either 
studies' results were spurious; therefore, a closer investigation of the 
studies, in light of the literature reviewed in Chapter 11, might pro­
vide a rationale for explaining the difference in results.
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Tannenbaum defines his primary variable, congruity, as a contingent 
of expectancy (here defined as the recipient's expectation of the asser­
tion).^ After partitioning his experimental audience according to their 
attitudes toward source and topic, Tannenbaum infers the expectancy of 
each classification of recipients on the basis of their pre-communication 
attitude configurations. His results support his predictions well (see 
Figure 1). However, the pilot study reported in Chapter II gives reason­
able assurance that expectancy is not necessarily a function of a reci­
pient's pre-communication attitudes (see Appendix A). Therefore, to 
explain the perfect accuracy of Tannenbaum's results, one must assume 
that either (1) the sources and topics used in the Tannenbaum study 
elicited expectancies common to all the experimental recipients, (2) some 
other variable or variables are closely correlated, but undefined, or 
(3) that expectancy does not affect congruity.
Bettinghaus' study employed the same procedure as Tannenbaum's. 
Bettinghaus' study was designed to study the oral communication situation, 
but otherwise the experimental population, the attitude measuring instru­
ment, methods of testing, etc., were very similar to Tannenbaum's. The 
results Bettinghaus reports, however, are highly contradictory to the 
predictions and results of the Tannenbaum model (see Figure 2). The 
obvious questions raised are "why do two similar studies yield different 
results?" and "what trends in each study's results might explain the 
reasons for the differences?"
To answer the first of these questions, the most obvious, of 
course, is the difference between the media used by the studies; however
^Tannenbaum, unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, p. 17.
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while evidence exists to illustrate that different media may be more or 
less effective in producing amounts of attitude change,% no evidence 
indicates that the medium through which the communication is transmitted 
is capable of effecting such wide divergences in direction of attitude 
change. Therefore, it would appear unlikely that the differences in 
media alone are capable of accounting for the different results.
Another possible answer to the question is the different natures 
of the communications (sources and topics) the respective studies used. 
Tannenbaum's sources were "popular" or "authoritative" (Labor unions.
The Chicago Tribune, and Labor leaders), while Bettinghaus' sources were 
relatively unknown undergraduate students. Here, perhaps, a distinction 
in expectancy can be made.
In the studies of expectancy reviewed in Chapter II (see page 31) 
one of the most uniform conclusions drawn by the researchers was that 
expectancy must exist, in fact, before it can be expected to have an 
effect on the dependent variable.3 In other words, there are some situa­
tions for which the participant does not generate an expectancy. More­
over, the Aronson and Carlsmith study Indicates that expectancy is 
subject to degrees of intensity, i.e., the "stronger" the expectancy is,
2
See R, H. Henneman, "Vision and Audition as Sensory Channels for 
Communications." Quarterly Journal of Speech, XXXVIII (April, 1952), 161- 
166; E. Kramar and T. Lewis, "Comparison of Visual and Non-Visual 
Listening." Journal of Communication. I (November, 1951), 16-20; Joseph 
T. Klapper, The Effects of Mass Communication (Glencoe, 111.: The Free
Press, 1960), pp. 106ff.
3The "level of aspiration" studies almost unanimously conclude 
this; also Aronson and Carlsmith, Brehm and Cohen are careful to state 
that not all situations create an "expectancy."
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the greater the persistence of choice becomes.^ The subjects who were 
required to wait 20 minutes before repeating their judgment tasks were 
significantly more likely to repeat the task of their first judgment. The 
authors interpret this finding as a variable of expectancy "strength," 
i.e., the longer the subject had to wait to repeat his judgments, the 
more time he had to develop a strong expectancy. It seems reasonable 
to assume that this same phenomenon could be generalized to Tannenbaum 
and Bettinghaus' more limited definition of expectancy since the sources 
(unknown graduate students) of Bettinghaus' study do not seem as conducive 
to generating a recipient expectancy of the assertion as the sources 
used in Tannenbaum's study.
Assuming for the moment that the effect of expectancy was less 
(or did not exist) in Bettinghaus' study, the second question (i.e., what 
trends in each study's results might explain the differences?) becomes 
pertinent. Since Tannenbaum's results are consistent with his predictions, 
we will assume that the variables he is studying are stable within his 
experimental situation; however, Bettinghaus working with the same predic­
tions does not get consistent results; therefore an attempt must be made 
to determine what factors were active in one study which were not active 
in the other.
One consistent trend in Bettinghaus' study and perhaps one of the 
reasons for his "divergent" results, is that in cases where the pre­
communication attitudes toward source and topic are sufficiently different 
or far apart to result in the attitude toward source appearing in a
^Aronson and Carlsmith, Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology.
LXVI.
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different category (+, 0, -) than the attitude toward the topic, the post­
communication attitude measure indicates that the respective attitudes 
have moved closer together (see Figure 2). This effect can be seen in 
11 of 12 categories in Bettinghaus' results.^ Such a consistent trend 
does not seem too surprising in light of the "adjective-noun" research 
Osgood, Tannenbaum and Suci have reported.^ In this study, the authors 
juxtapose two conflicting "signs," such as "lazy-athlete." The resultant 
shift in evaluative meaning a recipient has for each of the words in 
isolation undergoes change (always in the direction of the other word) 
toward compromise when they are perceived together.
If Bettinghaus' experimental communication stimuli did not generate 
a recipient expectancy of the assertion, the consistent trend in results 
along with a similar phenomenon demonstrated in the adjective-noun study, 
suggest that conflicting attitudes or signs are capable of producing in­
congruity merely by being related to each other in some meaningful manner; 
in the adjective-noun study the relationship is syntactical and in 
Bettinghaus' study the relationship is produced between the source and the 
topic merely by their being combined in the same total perception, i.e., 
the communication event. In other words, the relationship between source 
and topic is not absolutely dependent upon the position supported by the 
assertion--the simple presence of the objects (source and topic) of con­
flicting attitudes in a single perceptual experience seems adequate to
5Bettinghaus, Speech Monographs. XXVIII, 138. In some cases, both 
attitudes have changed in the same direction, but the amount of change 
one or the other underwent is sufficient to bring them "closer" together 
than they originally were.
^Osgood, Tannenbaum and Suci, The Measurement of Meaning, p. 275.
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produce incongruity. Also, if the presence of opposing attitudes toward
source and topic creates an incongruous situation despite the direction
of the assertion, it might explain the difficulty Osgood, Tannenbaum and
Suci have in defining an assertion. They write:
We realize that these examples do not provide a precise definition 
of 'assertion.' Although we are able to distinguish situations 
involving assertions (and hence dynamic interaction among sign- 
processes) from situations not involving assertions on an intuitive 
basis, so far we have not been able to make explicit the criteria 
on which we operate.^
In other words, the authors are saying that interaction occurs when con­
flicting signs or attitudes are related, but that they are not sure how 
the relation is effected in all cases. In communication situations, a 
link is established between source and topic regardless of the direction 
the assertion takes. As such, the assertion can be considered a separate 
factor in affecting attitude change.
This study, then will distinguish between: (1) incongruity which
results from disconfirmed expectancy, and (2) incongruity which results 
from the presence of two conflicting attitudes (source and topic) sharing 
a single perceptual event (the communication event). In the research 
cited above, both of these concepts seem to coincide with psychological 
conflict, therefore, to differentiate between them as sources of incon­
gruity, the first will be referred to as "disconfirmed expectancy," the 
second as "incongruity. "
A third factor affecting attitude change in communication is the 
assertion itself. In the discussion above the assertion was important only 
in that it confirmed or disconfirmed an expectancy; however, the assertion
?Ibid.. p. 203.
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is obviously a major factor in producing attitude change. By considering 
the assertion as an affective factor, additional ambiguity is encountered. 
In the example situations provided by Osgood, Tannenbaum and Suci, asser­
tions varied from a single verb (John is communistic) to a complete 
newspaper article. Length, strength, style, organization, and choice 
of arguments are but a few of the elements in an assertion that may be 
capable of changing its effectiveness in causing attitude change. The 
persuasive elements of an assertion are obviously capable of becoming 
more than a mere directional link between the source and topic as 
Tannenbaum's original study implied.® Bettinghaus, of course, recognized 
the potential affective power of an assertion and attempted to account 
for it in his design.^ He attempted to provide an absolute measure of 
"strong" or "weak" assertions; however, there is data to indicate that the 
relative effectiveness of an assertion depends upon whether the recipient 
perceives it to be strong or weak.^® Whether a recipient perceives an 
assertion as weak or strong is reliant upon the particular point of 
reference with which he compares it. The lack of some common reference 
point could have been an affective factor in Bettinghaus' study which 
prevented him from obtaining significant results.
Relative strength of the assertion cannot be demonstrated in this 
study; however, an effort was made, on an intuitive basis, to equate the 
assertions in as many aspects as possible. The lengths of the assertions, 
the strength and number of major arguments are designed to equalize the
^Tannenbaum, unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, p. 21.
^Bettinghaus, Speech Monographs. XXVIII, 131-142.
^^Sherif and Hovland, Social Judgment, p. 148.
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differences among the assertions (see Appendix D). Also, the order in 
which the assertions are presented, and the manner in which the assertions 
are attributed to sources are attempts to equate the experimental asser­
tions. These procedures are discussed in Chapter IV. Because of the 
difficulty in determining absolute strengths of different assertions, 
this study will necessarily assume that the assertions were successfully 
designed and are of similar strength.
In the discussion above, three factors have been theoretically 
distinguished which seem to be major factors in affecting attitude change 
through communication. They are: (1) disconfirmed expectancy, (2) incon­
gruity, and (3) the assertion. The discussion has attempted to show the 
nature of the three factors and how they have been demonstrated in 
analogous settings. They must now be related directly to a communication 
situation.
The first factor, expectancy, is the recipient's expectation of 
the position the source will support in his assertion. If the assertion 
supports the position the recipient expected it to support (i.e., the 
expectancy is confirmed), no incongruity is produced by this factor and 
any observed change in attitude will be attributed to other factors.
If the expectancy is disconfirmed, a shift in attitude toward both the 
source and topic will be affected.
If the expectancy is disconfirmed, attitude change toward the 
source will be a function of whether expectancy was (a) favorably discon­
firmed, i.e., recipient expects opposition to his original attitude 
toward the topic, but perceives support of it, or, (b) unfavorably discon­
firmed, i.e., the recipient expected support of his original attitude
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toward the topic but perceives opposition to it.
In the case of favorable disconfirmation of expectancy, the reci­
pient's estimation of the source will become more favorable (or less 
unfavorable)--especially if his attitude toward the source was originally 
unfavorable. In the case of disconfirmed expectancy, the recipient's 
attitude toward the source will be negatively affected--especially if 
it was positive originally.
Attitude change toward the topic will also be affected by discon­
firmed expectancy; however, whether the disconfirmed expectancy is 
favorably or unfavorably disconfirmed will have no differentiating effect 
on the attitude change toward the topic. The incongruity produced in 
this case for the recipient is created by the difference in his expectancy 
of the assertion and his perception of the assertion. This difference 
between expectancy and perception will be resolved by the recipient by 
adjusting his attitude toward the topic toward his expectancy. In other 
words, if a recipient has a favorable attitude toward a topic but expects 
a source to speak unfavorably about it, if the expectancy is disconfirmed, 
his attitude toward the topic will shift to a position of less favorable­
ness .
To summarize, the effect of expectancy will be tested across four 
different groups of recipients' source-topic preattitudes (i.e., favor­
able toward source-favorable toward topic; favorable toward source-un­
favorable toward topic, unfavorable toward source-favorable toward topic, 
and unfavorable toward source-unfavorable toward topic). In cases where
^^The effect of expectancy on attitude toward the topic is inferred 
from the Ewing study, see p. 35.
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expectancies are confirmed, attitude changes toward the source should be 
similar--despite the position supported by the assertion. On the other 
hand, attitude change toward the source in cases of disconfirmed expec­
tancy, will differ from attitude changes in confirmed expectancy cases and 
attitude change resulting from disconfirmed expectancies (favorable and 
unfavorable disconfirmation) will differ from each other.
The second major factor affecting attitude change is the incon­
gruity created by opposing attitudes of a recipient being combined in a 
single perceptual event--the communication event. This type of incongruity 
will influence attitude change toward both source and topic in cases 
where recipient attitudes toward source and topic in cases where recipient 
attitudes toward source and topic are different in terms of direction 
(i.e., favorable toward source-unfavorable toward topic, unfavorable toward 
source-favorable toward topic). In such cases, the attitudes toward 
source and topic will shift toward a "central" compromise, i.e., each 
attitude will shift toward the other attitude p o s i t i o n . I n  cases where 
recipient preattitudes are not in conflict (i.e., favorable toward the 
source-favorable toward topic, unfavorable toward source-unfavorable 
toward topic), the effect of this factor will be negligible.
The effect of this second factor will be studied by comparing cases 
in which all conditions of the communication event are similar except 
the condition of conflicting preattitudes. In this comparison, the cases 
in which preattitudes are in conflict should illustrate more of the cen­
tral compromise qualities than those cases in which preattitudes are not 
in conflict.
^^This attitude change is inferred from Osgood, Tannenbaum and 
Suci's adjective-noun study and from Bettinghaus' results.
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The third factor affecting attitude change is the arguments and 
persuasive elements contained in the assertion. The assertion, obviously, 
concentrates its influence upon changing the recipient's attitude toward 
the topic. The success in accomplishing this goal is largely a function 
of the recipient's susceptibility to the rhetorical devices utilized by 
the source. The influence of this third factor is typically in the 
direction advocated by the assertion (i.e., the direction perceived by 
the recipient). For the purposes of this experiment, the assertions will 
be written to be as uniform as possible. This effect of assertion strength 
will be minimized by systematically varying the source and topic combina­
tions and groups of recipients (this procedure is discussed in detail in 
Chapter IV). Also, there is a possibility of the assertion having some 
effect on attitude toward the source due to delivery variables (e.g., 
voice quality, rate, fluency, etc.); however, this possibility will also 
be minimized by the design of the study (see Chapter IV),
The effect of the assertion will be observed, in this study, by 
comparing all cases in which only the direction of the assertion varies. 
Attitude change toward the topic should always be affected by the differ­
ences in assertion direction.
Now that each of the three factors have been theoretically defined 
and operationalized in terms of this study, it is important to point out 
that the order in which they were discussed— with the possible exception 
of the first factor--does not necessarily suggest a natural or logical 
ordering of these factors. Moreover, the resultant influences of each 
factor is cumulative with the effect of each of the others, i.e., the 
influences exerted on attitudes by each of the factors will either add
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to or subtract from influences of the other factors. Also, the Influences 
of each of the three factors relative to each other cannot be absolutely 
quantified prior to a communication situation.
Some examples may help to clarify this point. Often expectancy 
is perhaps the most important factor, i.e., "I don't care who runs for 
President, as long as he opposes (or favors) the Civil Rights bill, I'll 
vote for him." In other cases, preattitudes may be most important, i.e., 
for a person who likes boxing, but dislikes Cassius Clay, the fact that 
the two attitudes are inextricably related might cause a compromise of 
the two regardless of any assertion by or expectation of Clay. Also, in 
many cases the assertion becomes primarily important--such as an unknown 
speaker who must rely almost wholly upon the effectiveness of his speech.
Realizing that any one of the three factors could have a dispro­
portionate effect, each of the factors will be studied in relative terms 
as discussed above, i.e., each will be studied and compared in cases 
where only the factor in question varies.
Investigation of these three factors will be made by combining 
them in all possible combinations. The combinations result in sixteen 
different arrangements which will be called categories and are defined 
in Figure 4. For convenience, the categories will be referred to by 
their appropriate numbers.
On the basis of the rationale suggested above, the following 
hypotheses will be tested:
I. The expectancy a recipient has for a given communication situa­
tion cannot consistently be inferred from the indices of his preattitudes 
toward the source and topic.
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FIGURE 4
THE SIXTEEN EXPERIMENTAL CATEGORIES
Categories
Situation Summarized by 
No. Preattitudes Assertion Symbols
Source Topic Expect Perceive
1. 4- + F F Recipient has favorable attitudes
toward source and topic; expects 
favorable assertion and perceives 
favorable assertion.
2. + + 0 F Recipient has favorable attitude
toward source and topic; expects 
source to oppose topic, perceives 
source favoring topic.
3. + + F 0 Recipient has favorable attitude
toward both source and topic; ex­
pects source to favor topic, per­
ceives source opposing topic.
4. + + 0 0  Recipient has favorable attitude
toward both source and topic; 
expects source to oppose topic, 
perceives source opposing topic.
5. + - F F Recipient has favorable attitude
toward source, unfavorable atti­
tude toward topic; expects source 
to favor topic, perceives source 
favoring topic.
6. + - O F  Recipient has favorable attitude
toward source, unfavorable attitude 
toward topic; expects source to 
oppose topic, perceives source 
opposing topic.
7. + - F 0 Recipient has favorable attitude
toward source, unfavorable attitude 
toward topic; expects source to favor 
topic, perceives source opposing 
topic.
8. + - 0 0  Recipient has favorable attitude
toward source, unfavorable attitude 
toward topic; expects source to 
oppose topic, perceives source 
opposing topic.
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FIGURE 4--Continued.
Categories
Situation Summarized by 
No. Preattitudes Assertion Symbols
Source Topic Expect Perceive
9. - + F F Recipient has unfavorable attitude
toward source, favorable attitude 
toward topic. He expects source 
to favor topic, perceives source 
favoring topic.
10. - 4 - 0  F Recipient has unfavorable attitude
toward source, favorable attitude 
toward topic; expects source to 
oppose topic, but perceives source 
favoring topic.
11. - 4- F 0 RecipientZhas unfavorable attitude
toward source, favorable attitude 
toward topic; expects source to 
favor topic, perceives source 
opposing topic.
12. - + 0 0  Recipient has unfavorable attitude
toward source, favorable attitude 
toward topic; expects source to 
oppose topic, perceives source 
opposing topic.
13. - - F F  Recipient has unfavorable attitude
toward source, unfavorable attitude 
toward topic; expects source to 
favor topic, perceives source 
favoring topic.
14. - - O F  Recipient has unfavorable attitude
toward source, unfavorable attitude 
toward topic; expects source to 
oppose topic,perceives source 
favoring topic.
15. - - F 0 Recipient has unfavorable attitude
toward source and topic; expects 
source to favor topic, perceives 
source opposing topic.
16. - - 0 0  Recipient has unfavorable attitude
toward source and topic; expects 
source to oppose topic, perceives 
source opposing topic.
52
II. Different recipient expectancies in similar communication 
situations will effect different amounts or direction of attitude change.
A. In similar communication situations, attitude change toward 
source will be different when recipient expectancies are 
confirmed than when recipient expectancies are disconfirmed,
B. In similar communication situations, attitude change toward 
source will not be affected by the assertion, when the 
recipient expectancy of the source is confirmed,
C. In similar communication situations, recipient attitudes toward 
the topic will change more in the direction advocated by the 
assertion (or less in the direction not advocated by the 
assertion) when the recipients' expectancies are confirmed 
than when the expectancies are disconfirmed.
Based on the three factors discussed above in the rationale of 
this study, the sixteen directional predictions of attitude change in 
Figure 5 are expected.
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FIGURE 5
DIRECTIONAL PREDICTIVE MODEL BASED ON THE HYPOTHESES OF THIS STUDY
Preattitudes Assertion
Category
Number Toward
Attitude Change 
Predicted 
for
Source Topic Expectancy Perceived Source Topic
1. + + Favor Favor + (LS) + (L)
2. + + Oppose Favor + (L) - (S)
3. + + Favor Oppose - -
4. + + Oppose Oppose + (LS) -
5. + - Favor Favor - +
6. + - Oppose Favor - +
7. + - Favor Oppose + (L) + (s)
8. + - Oppose Oppose - (s) - (LS)
9. - + Favor Favor + + (LS)
10. - + Oppose Favor + - (s)
11. - + Favor Oppose + (S) + (L)
12. - + Oppose Oppose + -
13. - - Favor Favor - (LS) +
14. - - Oppose Favor - +
15. - - Favor Oppose + + (s)
16. - - Oppose Oppose + (S) - (L)
L = The measure of more extreme attitude if they exist. is limite»
in these instances due to the limitations of the semantic differential 
scales.
S = Attitude change in these instances is expected to be slight 
owing to cancelling effect of affective factors hypothesized by this 
study.
CHAPTER IV
PROCEDURE
Eight sections of students in beginning speech courses at Oklahoma 
University served as subjects for this study. A total of 185 students 
completed the first test session. The section size averaged 23 and 
ranged from 20-26. All classes used for this study completed both 
testing sessions during regular class meetings. All classes met between 
8:00 and 11:00 a.m.
Of the 185 subjects participating in the first testing session, 
four failed to complete or incorrectly marked their test booklets. The 
design of the study required that each student's pretest be matched with 
his postest; therefore, thirteen subjects were lost because of absence 
during the second testing session, due to marking the second test booklet 
incorrectly, or because the experimenter was unable to match their first 
test booklet and their second test booklet with any reasonable degree of 
certainty. Two other subjects were dropped because their written remarks 
on the second test booklet invalidated their judgments.^ The final 
number of students participating in the study was 160. The experimental 
population consisted of 89 male and 71 female subjects. The mean age of 
the subjects was 19.
^One student caustically remarked that he had marked his booklet 
at random, another subject was late to both testing sessions and volun­
teered that she didn't know what she was doing.
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This study will be discussed in terms of pretest and postest; 
however, it should be noted that the subject expectancy (part of the pre­
test) was not measured until the second testing session (see Illustration 
1). Each subject's expectancy of each communication event was measured 
immediately before hearing the recorded communication; however, since 
each subject heard four different communications, the expectancy measure 
was taken at four different times during the second testing session. The 
pretest and postest, then, are divided by the communication stimulus which 
does not coincide with the two-week pause between first and second testing 
sessions.
The pretest of this study was designed to measure three dimensions 
of the experimental population. Two of these three measures were made 
during the first testing session. The first testing session measured:
(1) the recipients' attitudes toward the experimental sources and topics 
(preattitudes), and (2) the relative degree of "openmindedness" (dogma­
tism). The dogmatism test was Included in the study more as an addendum 
than as a central issue of the study. It was included to provide a rough 
measure of whether the dogmatic personality trait was correlated with the 
subject's tendency to violate the assumption that favored sources are ex­
pected to favor topics we favor, etc. The procedures and results of 
this test are discussed separately in Appendix B and will not be enlarged 
upon here.
The test booklet used in the first testing session was represented 
to the subjects as a public opinion survey which was being conducted by 
the Research Institute. The: semantic differential was used as the 
attitude measure and appeared first in the booklet. The instructions for
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using the semantic differential were printed on the cover of the test 
booklet (see Appendix C). The experimenter read the instructions aloud 
while the subjects followed the printed form. The subjects then indicated 
their attitudes toward nine sources and eight topics (only four of each 
were later chosen to be used--this procedure is discussed on page 58).
At the end of the attitude testing portion of the booklet was a "stop" 
page. When all students had completed the first portion of the booklet, 
they were asked to turn the page and follow the written instructions for 
the dogmatism test as the experimenter read them aloud.
The final page of the first booklet was an identification sheet. 
Provisions were made for indicating name, sex, age, major, college and 
the subject's written reaction to the survey, ^he subjects were again 
informed that their responses in the booklet would not affect their grade 
in the class nor would they be asked to explain any of their responses. 
They were informed that if they did not want to place their name on the 
paper, that it would be "all right" but they should be sure to give 
accurate accounts of the other information called for. The purpose of 
the identification sheet.was; of course, to enable the experimenter to 
match each student's pretest with his postest. When the name was omitted 
(as it seldom was) the other information, especially the handwriting of 
the subject's comments, was used to match each subject's first booklet 
with his second booklet.
During the two weeks between the first and second testing session, 
the distribution of preattitudes toward each of the nine sources and 
eight topics was compiled and analyzed (see Table 1). Four sources and 
four topics were chosen to be used in the communication stimuli on the
TABLE 1
DISTRIBUTION OF FAVORABLE AND UNFAVORABLE PREATTITUDES TOWARD THE EXPERIMENTAL SOURCES 
AND TOPICS IN THE ORDER OF APPEARANCE IN PRETEST BOOKLET
Group Sources and Topics
Number 1* 2 3* 4 5* 6 7* 8* 9* 10* 11 12* 13 14 15 16 17
1 (n=20) Pos. Att. 1 12 0 4 2 0 4 10 2 11 12 5 10 2 10 14 3
Neg. Att. 10 1 9 9 9 11 8 1 8 1 0 :5 2 7 3 0 7
2 (n=23) Pos. Att. 5 15 2 5 2 0 11 18 1 19 17 13 13 2 13 21 44
Neg. Att. 11 1 16 15 11 16 7 1 15 :o 1 8 4 15 5 0 14
3 (n=23) Pos. Att. 7 15 4 1 0 0 9 18 0 17 17 13 11 1 9 18 7
Neg. Att. 8 1 10 18 13 16 6 1 18 0 0 3 3 15 5 0 7
6 (n=24) Pos. Att. 8 19 2 4 2 2 7 18 4 21 18 7 9 1 18 21 6
Neg. Att. 8 0 17 14 22 19 12 2 16 0 3 10 8 19 2 0 11
5* (n=26) Pos. Att. 2 13 2 1 3 0 8 13 2 12 14 8 7 0 15 16 5
Neg. Att. 10 0 11 12 8 15 6 3 11 0 0 5 7 14 0 0 5
6 (n-24) Pos. Att. 9 19 1 0 1 0 11 19 4 22 20 15 15 0 20 21 7
Neg. Att. 6 0 19 20 14 14 8 1 15 0 0 4 4 20 2 0 5
7 (n=25) Pos. Att. 6 13 4 2 1 0 10 12 2 12 15 11 10 0 8 12 7
Neg. Att. 5 0 8 8 10 9 5 2 8 2 1 4 4 11 2 1 8
8 (n=20) Pos. Att. 4 14 2 4 0 0 7 15 2 16 15 10 8 1 10 15 4
Neg. Att. 7 0 6 9 10 13 6 1 13 0 0 2 2 11 0 0 5
Total Pos. Att. 42 17 11 67 123 17 130 82
(N=185) Neg. Att. 65 96 97 58 12 104 3 41
Ui
00
*Experimental Sources and Topics chosen to be used: 5. Robert Welch; 8. Robert McNamara; 9. Bobby 
Baker; 10. Scott Carpenter; 1. A Boycott of British-made goods; 3. Prayer in the public schools; 7. medicare 
for the aged; 12. Nuclear treaty with Russia.
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basis of the following criteria:
1. Sources and topics toward which the subjects held the largest 
total number of favorable (+) and unfavorable (-) attitudes.
2. Sources (or topics) toward which the subject's attitudes had 
approximately the same frequency of favorable and unfavorable attitudes 
when combined with the other experimental sources (or topics).
Two generally favorable sources (Scott Carpenter and Rober McNamara) 
and two generally unfavorable sources (Robert Baker and Robert Welch) were 
chosen to be used in the study. Four topics were chosen. For two of the 
topics, subjects' attitude scores were about evenly distributed in favor­
able and unfavorable ranges. For the other two topics, the subjects' 
attitude scores were generally favorable for one and generally unfavor­
able for the other.
Two 3-4 minute press releases were written for each of the four 
topics. One press release favored the topic and the other press release 
opposed the topic. Trained speakers were used to record the releases to 
minimize distinctive voice qualities or other delivery quirks.
There were three factors in the communication stimuli which were 
systematically varied. The factors were: (1) the four sources, (2) the
four topics, and (3) the direction of the assertion (favor or oppose).
Each experimental group of subjects heard assertions about the same four 
topics in the same order; however, four of the groups heard assertions 
that favored a given topic, while the other four groups heard assertions 
that opposed that same topic.
Each topic was attributed to each source.two different times 
(once favoring the topic, once opposing the topic) to two different
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groups. While eaCh group heard an assertion about each topic, no two 
groups heard the same assertion (they heard eifhdr favor or oppose) 
attributed to the same source. In other words, all eight assertions (one 
favoring, one opposing each of four topics) were attributed once to each 
of the four sources, with no single group hearing the same assertion 
attributed to the same source as any other group. This procedure is 
summarized in Figure 6.
On the recorded versions of each press release identification tag 
lines were placed just prior to the message and immediately following the 
message. A jtypical tag line was, "UPI press release, number (a four digit 
number). (Name of source) on (topic). UPI (A date, in numerical form). 
The press releases and tag lipes were arranged for presentation according 
to the combination of sources and topics illustrated in Figure 6.
Some effort was made to disassociate the postesting session from 
the pretesting session. This effort was made to reduce the possibility 
of the subjects remembering or being biased by their responses on the 
semantic differential in the first testing session. The postest was 
attributed to a "Dr. Rogers from another university who had asked that a 
sample opinion survey be taken on Oklahoma University's campus because 
much of the research at the respective universities was very similar and 
could be compared." Having thus revealed the purpose of the task, the 
instructions printed on the cover sheet of the test booklet were read 
aloud as the subjects followed (see Appendix C for instructions).
The postesting session of the study involved four judgments of
2
The procedure here is similar to the procedure used by Tannenbaum. 
See his "Initial Attitude Toward Source and Concept . . .," in unpublished 
Ph.D. Dissertation, or (same title), in Public Opinion Quarterly, p. 417.
FIGURE 6
ORDER OF PRESENTATION OF COMMUNICATION STIMULUS
Topics^
1 2 3
Experimental
4
, Croups 
5 6 7 8
1 Welch Welch McNamara McNamara Baker Baker Carpenter Carpenter
Favor Oppose' Oppose Favor Favor Oppose Oppose Oppose
2 McNamara McNamara Baker Baker Carpenter Carpenter Welch Welch
Oppose Favor Favor Oppose Oppose Favor Favor Oppose
3 Baker Baker Carpenter Carpenter Welch Welch McNamara McNamara
Oppose Favor Oppose Favor Oppose Favor Favor Oppose
4 Carpenter Carpenter Welch Welch McNamara McNamara Baker Baker
Favor Oppose Favor Oppose Favor Oppose Favor Oppose
3-Topics: 1.
2 .
3.
A Proposal to Finance Medical Care for the Aged by Increasing Social Security 
Assessments.
A Treaty Between Russia and the U. S. Banning Underground Nuclear Testing.
A Voluntary Public Boycott in America of British-made Products to Discourage 
Britain from Selling Goods to Cuba.
The Supreme Court Ruling Banning Prayers in Public Schools.
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each of the four communication stimuli. First the subjects were told the 
topic of the release and the name of the person to whom it was attributed. 
They were asked to indicate their expectancy (favor or oppose) of the 
assertion. They then turned to the next page of the booklet which was 
blank, while they listened to the press release. Immediately following 
the recording, the subjects indicated their attitudes, via the semantic 
differential, for both source and topic (and in that order). The fourth 
judgment task required the subjects to indicate the actual position (favor 
or oppose) they believed the speaker had supported in his release. This 
final measure assured the experimenter that the message had been perceived 
as it was intended to be. The procedure explained above was repeated for 
each of four recordings that each of the eight groups heard.
Again, as in the first testing session, an identification sheet 
was the last page of the booklet. Considerably more pressure was exerted 
to get the names of the subjects on the booklets. Names, obviously, made 
matching the first booklet with the second booklet for each subject more 
reliable. Also, the actual testing was complete at this point; therefore 
no danger of contaminating the judgments remained. With the conseht of 
the instructor of each speech class, the students were told that the class 
roll would be determined by the names on the booklets. Only a small per­
centage of the booklets did not have the subject's name:on them.
The semantic differential. The semantic differential was used to 
measure attitudes in this study. The logic of the semantic differential 
is fully developed in Osgood, Tannenbaum and Suci's book and will not be 
discussed here.^ Essentially, the technique involves the judgment of a
3
Osgood, TannenbBum and Suci, The Measurement of Meaning.
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concept such as "A public boycott of British-made goods" or "Scott Carpen­
ter" against a series of scales (see Appendix C for instruments used in 
this study). Each of these scales is defined by a pair of polar adjectives 
placed at opposite ends of a seven point continuum. The subject is asked 
to check the position on the scales which best represents his feelings 
about the concept. So that this study could be compared with the 
studies of Tannenbaum and Bettinghaus, the scales used by both authors 
were used in this study. The scales were clean-dirty, fair-unfair, tasty- 
distasteful, reputable-disreputable, valuable-worthless, and pleasant- 
unpleasant.
To compute the value of each set of scales, the favorable or 
"good" pole of the scale is assigned a value of seven, the unfavorable or 
"bad" pole is assigned a value of one. Each scale position between 
extremes is assigned a value from two to six in series. Each experimental 
scale is scored according to the position of the subject's mark. The 
score for each individual scale is combined with the score of every other 
experimental scale yielding a total or composite index of the subject's 
attitude toward the concept. On the instrument used in this study the 
six experimental scales could yield a range of scofes from 6 to 42.
In addition to the six experimental scales used in this study, 
four additional scales were added (but not scored) to minimize the possi­
bility of subjects remembering their markings from one test to the next 
thereby introducing an order bias among the concepts. Also, four differ­
ent arrangements of the same scales were used in the study. The different 
arrangements were effected by changing the order of the scales and by 
reversing the polarity of some of the scales. This procedure was followed
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to minimize the possibility of the subjects establishing a pattern <onf. 
"set" for marking the scales.
The measure of expectancy. One of the most important aspects of 
this study is the explicit measure of expectancy. Prior studies 
dealing with source and topic interaction have provided only implicit 
indications of what a recipient expects from a given communication.^
The earlier discussion of studies by Tannenbaum and Bettinghaus suggests 
that inferring expectancy from measured attitude toward source and topic 
may not be valid. This study will provide an explicit measure of 
expectancy rather than infer expectancy from measures of attitude.
A pilot study (see page 29 and Appendix A) was conducted to pro­
vide a preliminary test of the validity of inferring expectancy from 
attitude measures. The attitudes of twenty-seven students toward four 
sources and four topics were measured. Following the attitude measure, 
each subject was asked to indicate the position he would expect each 
source to support on each topic. The instrument used in this preliminary 
study was :
The position on the scale I would expect (source) to support
when speaking on (topic) is:
Favor :____:_____:____ :_____:____ : Oppose
All combinations of sources and topics were inserted. Analysis of the 
results indicated that over 30 percent of the responses were not pre­
dicted by the assumption that favored sources are expected to favor 
topics that are favorable, etc. The relatively high percentage of
^See page 22.
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responses that could not be accounted for suggested that either (1) the 
assumption was not valid or (2) the expectancy instrument, above, was 
not measuring the real expectancy of the subjects.
To test the validity of the expectancy measuring instrument, a 
second pilot study was conducted. The procedure of the second study was 
essentially the same as the first (see Appendix A). Attitudes toward 
four sources and four topics were measured with a semantic differential 
attitude test. Each of the four sources was paired with one of the four 
topics and inserted into the following measure:^
The position I expect (source) to support in his press
release on (topic) is :
 Favor
 Oppose
Again over 30 percent of the responses on the expectancy measure were not
accurately predicted by the assumption of favored sources supporting
favorable topics.
The same subjects were then given a list of twelve statements for
each of four source-topic combinations, i.e., each source was paired
with one of the topics yielding four source-topic pairs. Each list of
statements was prefaced by the following instruction:
In (source's) statement about (topic), I would expect that
some of the following arguments or statements would be
used: (circle the arguments you think he will most likely use.)
^The "neutral" position was omitted from this scale when the first 
study illustrated that it was used only in rare instances. This deletion 
of the neutral position is discussed fully in Appendix A. Since the 
scale units on the prior measuring instrument could not be assumed to have 
equal intervals for all subjects, they, also, were deleted.
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Of the twelve statements which followed the instructions for each of 
the four source-topic combinations, six statements favored the topic and 
six statements opposed the topic. The twelve statements for each of the 
source-topic combinations had been previously validated in terms of the 
direction they supported (this validation is discussed in Appendix A).
The results of the pilot study indicated that with 100 percent 
reliability, subjects who expected a source to favor a topic chose only 
from the statements which favored the topic. In other words, the expec­
tancy the subjects indicated on the expectancy measure were perfectly 
reflected by the type of arguments they expected the source to use. The 
same results were obtained for subjects expecting a source to oppose a 
topic.
The conclusions tentatively drawn from the pilot studies discussed 
above are:
1. The expectancy a recipient has of the assertion in an announced 
communication event is not predictable from measures of his attitudes 
toward the source and the topic of the proposed communication event.
2. The expectancy measuring device used in the studies measures a 
real expectancy that a recipient has of a proposed communication event.
The second instrument measuring expectancy described above was 
used in the present study and was administered to the experimental subjects 
immediately before they heard the particular communication event whose 
source and topic were inserted.
Sources for the communication stimulus. The experimental sources 
used in this study were chosen on the basis of several criteria. The 
messages or assertions were to take the form of tape recorded press
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releases enabling the experimenter to choose from a wide range of 
possible sources.
Three different possibilities were considered. The sources could 
be actual persons who read short manuscripts which reflected their own 
opinions about certain topics. Such a procedure would have required some 
technique (such as Bettinghaus used) to acquaint the persons with the 
audience prior to the delivery of the communication so that the audience 
would have the opportunity to form an opinion or attitude toward the 
source. However, Bettinghaus' results imply that his experimental audie 
ences held their attitudes toward the topics much more strongly than 
their attitudes toward the recently introduced sources, resulting in a 
noticeably larger shift in attitudes toward the speaker than toward the 
topics.
The second possibility was to use sources of a fictitious nature, 
e.g., the "director of Social Security," or "a soldier," "a communist" 
or "John Malone, Under-Secretary of State." Using fictitious sources 
creates the possibility that different recipients may have different 
referents for the same term. "Communist," for example, may refer to 
"Khruschchev, " "underground agents," or a variety of other concepts for 
different recipients. This variability of reference would be extremely 
difficult to assess; therefore, this possibility was rejected.
The third possibility for selection of sources was to use well- 
known persons. This alternative presented the problem of either 
acquiring the assistance of well-known persons in preparing the communica­
tion stimuli or using the well-known person's name and simulating an 
assertion which could be attributed to the person. The third method was
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chosen because it seemed a more realistic method. The experimental sub­
jects could be expected to have more meaningful attitudes toward real 
sources than they would have toward fictitious, unknown, or ambiguous 
sources.
After choosing the third method, the following additional criteria 
were established to serve as guidelines for choosing the nine sources to 
be included in the pretesting attitude measure.
1. Names chosen must be sufficiently well known to allow the
a priori assumption that most experimental subjects hold relatively well- 
formed attitudes toward each source.
2. Source's voice must not be readily identified because of: (a) 
regional dialects (such as Robert Kennedy's Bostonian dialect), (b) age, 
or (c) extensive public exposure (appearances on television, radio, etc.).
3. Sources must reasonably be expected to speak on the topics to 
be chosen for the assertions, i.e., one would probably not expect Premier 
Khruschchev to spea% on the beauties of democratic living.
4. Sources must be male.
Nine sources were chosen which the experimenter felt adhered most 
closely to the criteria above. These nine sources were included in the 
pretests of attitude. The success of the criteria would be indicated by 
the experimental subject's reaction to the communication stimuli. If the 
subjects questioned the authenticity of the simulated press releases, the 
criteria probably had not been satisfied.
Following the first testing session, the distribution of favorable 
and unfavorable attitudes toward each of the nine sources was determined 
(see Table 1). Four names--two generally unfavorable, two generally favor­
able— were chosen to be used as sources in the communication stimuli.
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The names chosen were Robert McNamara (Secretary of Defense), Robert 
"Bobby" Baker (former Secretary to the Senate Democrats), Robert Welch 
(author of the John Birch Society's Blue Book), and Scott Carpenter 
(astronaut).
Topics for the communication stimuli. The following criteria were 
established by the experimenter to serve as guidelines in choosing the 
topics to be used in this study:
1. The topics should be of timely interest. Timely interest was 
defined as a popular controversy which had received rather extensive 
publicity in the mass media within six months of the time when the experi­
mental subjects would hear the experimental assertions.
2. The topics should be of sufficient significance to warrant the 
assumption that the subjects have some knowledge of them. This criterion 
limited the topics to controversies of national importance and excluded 
controversies of a local or state level.
3. It should be reasonable to assume that the subjects have a 
relatively stable attitude toward the topics. This criterion is actually 
contingent upon the first two criteria. In other words, the experimental 
subjects should have had ample time and/or opportunity (because of the 
publicity each controversy enjoyed) to form attitudes toward the topics.
4. The topics should be stated in a manner that is sufficiently 
specific. Many studies (including Tannenbaum and Bettinghaus') use 
relatively ambiguous topics such as "labor unions." Such a term might 
refer to something different for each experimental subject; therefore, 
this study narrowed relatively ambiguous references as "prayer in the 
public schools" to "the Supreme Court ruling banning prayer in the public
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schools. Such a procedure would seem to provide a more specific focal
point for the attitudes of the experimental subjects.
5. The nature of each topic should provide a believable circum­
stance when attributed to any of the four experimental sources. This 
criterion is the same as no. 3 under "sources" above. In other words, 
the combining of a source with a particular topic should not produce dis- 
trufitior disbelief of the situation in the minds of the subjects.
On the basis of the criteria above, eight topics were chosen and 
included in the pretest. Following the pretesting sessions, the distri­
bution of attitudes toward each of the topics was determined (Gee Table
1). Four of the eight original topics were chosen on the basis of the 
experimental subjects' attitude toward them. The topics chosen represent 
one topic toward which attitudes were generally favorable, one topic 
toward which attitudes were generally unfavorable, and two topics toward 
which the number of favorable and unfavorable attitudes was approximately 
equal. The topics were:
1. A voluntary boycott in America of British-made products to 
discourage Britain from selling goods to Cuba.
2. A proposal to finance medical care for the aged by increasing
social security assessments.
3. A treaty between Russia and the United States banning under­
ground nuclear testing.
4. The Supreme Court ruling banning prayer in the public schools.
For each of the experimental topics, two 3-4 minute press releases
were written— one favoring the topic, the other opposing the topic. The 
procedure for recording the releases is discussed below.
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Press releases. Having chosen the sources and topics, it was 
necessary to simulate press releases that would be believable. The four 
topics chosen for this study and the four sources are discussed separately 
above. Eight 3-4 minute press releases were', written (one favoring and one 
opposing each of the four topics). Four male speakers were chosen from 
among the Oklahoma University speech department staff to record the
releases. The speakers were instructed to read the material in a manner
suitable to the usual prepared statement type of press release, i.e., 
a dry, rather monotonous voice, substituting loudness for pitch variation, 
etc. The recordings were made in four different rooms giving each re­
cording a different sound location. The occasional hesitancies or back­
ground noises that occurred during the taping session were not edited out.
To enhance the concept of press releases each individual recording 
had a brief instruction and tag line added to it before it was heard by 
the experimental audiences. The introduction and tag line identified the 
recording as a press release. The delivery techniques of the speakers 
were not good as judged by public speaking standards (as would be expected 
in a press release), but the physical qualities of the recordings (intelli­
gibility , etc.) was good.
The final recordings sounded quite authentic to the experimenter 
and apparently sounded authentic to the experimental audiences since not 
one subject questioned the authenticity of the releases and several subjects 
indicated their delight in hearing "real, unedited press releases."
Summary
Eight sections of students in beginning speech classes at the 
University of Oklahoma participated in this experiment. The total number
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of students who completed all ph-ases of the testing procedures was 160.
The first testing session measured the subjects' attitudes toward 
nine sources and eight topics. Four sources and four topics were chosen 
on the basis of the distribution of favorable and unfavorable attitudes 
toward each. Eight assertions— one favoring and one opposing each of the 
four topics--were prepared and recorded on tape.
Two weeks later, each of the eight groups of subjects heard four 
assertions which were attributed to the four sources; however, the sources, 
and the direction of the assertion (favor or oppose) were systematically 
varied so that none of the groups heard an assertion whose direction and 
apparent source was the same as any other group. The purpose of this 
variation was to broaden the scope of the stimuli to better determine if 
the effects hypothesized by this study were in fact dominant factors in 
accounting for attitude change through communication.
Immediately before hearing each communication, each subject indi­
cated the direction he expected the assertion to support relative to the 
topic. The subjects then heard a simulated press release which was attri­
buted to one of the four experimental sources. Following the communica­
tion stimulus, each subject's attitude toward both source and topic was 
measured. After indicating their attitudes, the subjects each indicated 
which direction they perceived the assertion to actually support. The 
procedure described in this paragraph was repeated for each of the four 
communications each group heard.
The responses of subjects in the eight groups who (Completed the 
testing procedure were partitioned according to all possible combinations 
of preattitudes, expectancies, and direction of the assertion, into
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sixteen categories. The attitude change observed in each of the categories 
served as the basic elements for analyzing the results of this study.
CHAPTER V
RESULTS AND CONCLUSIONS
The 160 subjects composing the experimental population for this 
study were each exposed to four different source-topic-assertlon combi­
nations (see Chapter IV). This procedure could have resulted in 640 
individual measures of attitude change; however, owing to the ambiguity 
of the neutral position on the semantic differential attitude measure 
(see Appendix C, "Instructions for Semantic Differential") only the 
subjects whose preattitudes conformed with source-topic combinations of 
favorable-favorable (S+T+), favorable-unfavorable (S+T-), unfavorable- 
favorable (S-T+), and unfavorable-unfavorable (S-T-), were used for the 
analysis. The rationale for this method of subject selection is dis­
cussed on page 37 of Chapter II. Essentially, the choice of subjects 
according to their favorable and unfavorable attitudes is based on the 
assumption that a "directional" attitude (as opposed to a "neutral" 
attitude) would be more conducive to generating an expectancy of the 
attitude's referent. In other words, this study assumes that a reci­
pient with a directional attitude (i.e., favorable or unfavorable) toward 
a concept such as "Barry Goldwater" would generate an expectancy of an 
announced communication by Goldwater more readily than a recipient who 
didn't know or didn't care about Goldwater. This assumption is based 
on the theories and results of studies of general expectancy (see
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Chapter II, pp. 31
The semantic differential attitude measure used in this study 
provided a range of possible scores from 42 to 6: 42 was the most favor­
able response possible, 6 the most unfavorable. The arbitrary division 
assigned to the range of scores was: 6-20, unfavorable; 28-42, favorable.
Two hundred fifty-nine cases met the criteria set forth in the paragraph 
above. In other words, ^the 160 subjects in the eight experimental 
groups resulted in 259 cases in which a subject heard a source-topic 
combination (press release) toward which his preattitudes were favorable- 
favorable (S+T+), favorable-unfavorable (S+T-), etc. The relatively low 
number of cases fulfilling the selection criteria indicates a low percen­
tage of involvement in the experimental population relative to the 
particular source-topic combinations each group heard.
The 259 individual cases which met the criteria of this study were 
assigned to categories according to their preattitudes toward source and 
topic, their expectancy, and direction they perceived the assertion to 
support. As this study predicted, categories representing ail possible 
combinations of preattitudes, expectancies, and perceived directions 
of the assertion, were created by this partitioning. The number of sub­
jects in each category varied from 3 to 43. Tannenbaum's prediction 
that "we expect sources we favor to favor topics we favor, etc.," would 
have predicted only eight of the sixteen categories resulting from this 
procedure. In other words, by actually measuring each recipient's 
expectancy rather than inferring expectancy as earlier studies have done.
^Especially "level of aspiration" studies and Aronson and Carlsmith
studies.
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this study has, in effect, divided then original categories established 
by Tannenbaum and copied by Bettinghaus.
Over one-third of the cases violated Tannenbaum's assumption that 
favored sources favor favored topics, etc. A chi-square test of fre­
quencies was applied to provide a statistical estimate of the difference. 
The test yielded a chi-square value of 31.23, which with 3 degrees of 
freedom, is significant beyond the 0.005 level of confidence (see Table
2). The evidence supports hypothesis I which suggests that expectancy 
is not predictable from pre-communication measures of attitude toward a 
source and a topic. It should be noted that categories 1, 3, 6, 8, 10, 
12, 13, and 15, are the same as eight categories used in the Tannenbaum 
and Bettinghaus studies. The other categories, i.e., 2, 4, 5, 7, 9, 11, 
14, and 16, respectively, represent categories in which the basic assump­
tion of the "congruity theory" we expect sources we favor to favor 
topics we favor, etc., was not valid. In this study, the major analyses 
will compare the two categories in each of the category pairs, 1-2, 4-3, 
5-6, 8-7, 9-10, 12-11, 13-14, and 16-15, to test the relative effect of 
expectancy on attitude change toward source and topic.
Before analyzing attitude change, it was first necessary to deter­
mine if the communication stimuli had, in fact, effected attitude changes 
among the experimental recipients. T-tests were applied between the pre­
test and postest attitude scores for both source and topic within each 
category. In 14 of the 32 cases, attitude change amounts were statisti­
cally significant beyond the .05 percent level. The 14 cases sighificafife 
beyond the .05 level exceed chance^probability;’therefpre, 
the assumption that the communication stimuli would effect attitude
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change was supported (see Table 3). It should be noted that in several 
categories, attitude change was predicted to be slight; therefore, the 
fact that some categories did not show significant attitude change is not 
unexpected.
TABLE 2
SUMMARY OF DATA ILLUSTRATING NUMBER OF RECIPIENTS WHO VIOLATED 
EXPECTANCY ASSUMPTION OF EARLIER STUDIES
Preattitudes
of
Recipients 
Source Topics
Predicted 
Expectancy 
According to 
Earlier 
Studies
Number of 
Recipients' Chi-
Expectancies Square
That Value
Conformed Violated
+
+
Total
Favorable
Assertion
Unfavorable
Assertion
Unfavorable
Assertion
Favorable
Assertion
52
45
32
37
166
16
28
24
25
93 31.23 
(p. <  .005) 
(d.f. =  3)
A main objective of this study is to determine if expectancy has 
an effect on attitude change. The test of this factor is readily made by 
comparing category pairs in which expectancy is the only variable factor. 
The difference in attitude change effected by corresponding differences 
in expectancy could vary in two different dimensions, i.e., in mean 
difference (i.e., amount of change as tested by t-tests) or in variance
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TABLE 3
MEAN ATTITUDE CHANGE TOWARD SOURCE AND TOPIC WITHIN CATEGORIES
Categories Mean Attitude
Change and
Category Preattitude Assertion Direction of
Number Change®’
Source Topic Expect Perceive N Source Topic
1 + + F F 43 +G.78 +1.46
2 + + G F 13 -G.G8 -7.G0b
3 + + F G 9 -2.67 -7.33
4 + + 0 G 3 +1.37 -17.GGb
5 + F F 17 -2.41 +15.88®
6 + - 0 F 25 -1.28 +8.08C
i: + F G 11 +2. GO +3.37
8 — - 0 0 2G -1.55 -G.80
9 + F F 17 4iLG6C -1.95
10 - F G F 19 +12.15b -1.37
11 + F G 7 +7.GG -3.63
12 - + G G 13 +9.31^ -9.47®
13 _ F F 19 +8.79® +1G.31C
14 - - G F 8 +13.45b +11.87®
15 _ F G 18 +8.17c -G.30
16 - - G G 17 47.77c -G.97
&Based on a maximum possible chapge of 36. GG.
b.05 level of confidence.
^.01 level of confidence.
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(as tested by F-tests). In other words, if attitude change in a con­
firmed expectancy category was generally in the same direction, but smaller 
(or larger) than the measured attitude change in a disconfirmed expectancy 
category, the variance of scores in each category would be similar, but 
the mean amount of attitude change would differ. Such a difference 
should be shown to be significant by t-tests between the respective means. 
On the other hand, if one or the other categories differing only in terms 
of expectancy resulted in individual attitude changes that were largely 
inconsistent with the attitude changes in the other category, a test 
comparing the variance of the two categories (i.e., the F-test) would 
likely show statistically significant differences. This study is inter­
ested in either or both types of differences; therefore, both the F-test 
and the t-test were applied to the data.^
The test of variance was applied to the measured individual atti­
tude change scores (I-scores) in each of the category pairs for both 
source and topic. Of the 16 comparisons made, two were significant at 
the .02 level (see Table 4). Both of the significant differences were 
found in attitude change toward the topic. The number of significant 
comparisons was not sufficiently consistent to attribute to factors 
other than chance.
To test the significance of mean attitude change between the 
categories which differ only in recipient expectancy, t_-tests were applied. 
The category pairs used in this analysis are the same as those used in 
the variance test described above. The t-test would indicate if the
9
Helen Walker and Joseph Lev, Statistical Inference (New York:
Henry Holt and Co., 1953), pp. 143, 185 ff.
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TABLE 4
TESTS FOR VARIANCE RATIO OF CATEGORY PAIRS
Categories
Cate­
gory Preattitudes Assertion 
Number Source Topic Expect Perceive
Test of Variance”
Source Topic
N
1 + + F F 43 17.9 N.S. 21.4 6.19b
2 + + 0 F 13 20.9 132.7
3 + + F 0 9 46.2 N.S. 129.0 N.S.
4 + + 0 0 3 10.4 25.4
5 + - F F 17 38.9 N.S. 46.6 N.S.
6 + - 0 F 25 38.5 67.1
7 + - F 0 11 20.8 N.S. 83.6 3.99b
8 + - 0 0 20 20.8 20.9
9 - + F F 17 145.5 N.S. 32.0 N.S.
10 - + 0 F 19 93.8 46.5
11 - + F 0 7 60.3 N.S. 12.95 N.S.
12 - + 0 0 13 36.6 48.3
13 - - F F 19 72.9 N.S. 79.0 N.S.
14 - - 0 F 8 122.8 49.3
15 - - F 0 18 61.9 N.S. 15.27 N.S.
16 0 0 17 52.0 34.4
^F = S^/S2
^Significant at .02 level of confidence. 
N. S. = Not significant above .20 level.
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amount of change in the two categories of each category pair was statis­
tically significant. The nature of this measure in this study requires 
prefacing.
The dynamic interaction between source and topic has been re­
peatedly demonstrated (see Chapter II). To cite the two examples most 
cogent to this study, Tannenbaum found most attitude change occurred 
toward the topic in his study. Bettinghaus, on the other hand, reports 
a dominant amount of change toward the sources. Both authors measured 
the total effect of their communication stimuli by D-scores which are com­
puted by comparing the difference between source and topic scores on the 
pretest with the difference between source and topic on the postest.
The direct comparison of the attitude score for source with the attitude 
score for topic necessitates the assumption that the scale intervals 
(i.e., the distance between any two scale positions) are the same for 
both concepts (i.e., source and topic). While such a procedure is con­
venient, it is not necessarily valid. The semantic differential is not 
necessarily comparable across concepts. Osgood, Tannenbaum and Suci write:
Several conclusions seem justified by these studies of compara­
bility across concepts. In the first place, it is clear that there 
is a high degree of concept-scale interaction; the meaning of 
scales and their relation to other scales vary considerably with 
the concept being judged.^
For this reason, this study will not duplicate Tannenbaum's and 
Bettinghaus' procedures; rather, it will compare attitude change toward 
the source in one category with the attitude change toward the source in 
the other category within each category pair and attitude change toward 
the topic with attitude change toward the topic (this prevents having to
^Osgood, Tannenbaum and Suci, The Measurement of Meaning, p. 187.
82
compare source with topic as Tannenbaum and Bettinghaus did), This 
method of comparison does not deny existence of source-topic interaction-- 
it just does not attempt to measure it directly.
In the eight possible category comparisons, if t-test indicates 
a significant difference between either source or topic comparisons, 
Hypothesis II (i.e., differences in expectancy will cause differences in 
attitude change) will be supported.
The t^tests were applied between mean attitude change scores 
(C-scores) for sources and again for topics within each category pair.
Both categories in each category pair were similar except for the differ­
ence in expectancy. Results indicate that four of eight possible cate­
gory comparisons yielded t-values beyond the .05 level of confidence 
between either source or the topic differences (see Table 5). One 
category comparison shows significant difference between attitude 
change toward source, while three show significant different attitude 
changes toward the topic.
The evidence supports Hypothesis II--that expectancy is an 
affective factor in attitude change in some cases, i.e., different 
expectancies result in differences in attitude change. This result would 
obviously have been more powerful if it had been consistently significant 
in all comparisons of categories differing in expectancy; however, since 
the trends appear consistent, but the differences in all comparisons do 
not indicate statistical t-values, a more generalized analysis is needed.
Such an analysis is provided by a generalized distance formula 
of solid geometry.5 The rationale for using this formula to analyze
5c. Osgood and G. Suci, "A Measure of Relation Determined by Both 
Mean Difference and Profile Information," Psychological Bulletin, XLIX 
(1952), 251-262. Also, see: H. Webster, "A Note on Profile Similarity,"
Psychological Bulletin. XLIX (1952), 538-39.
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TABLE 5
T-TEST COMPARISON OF TOTAL ATTITUDE CHANGE IN 
DIFFERING IN EXPECTANCY ONLY
CATEGORIES
Mean
Subjects Change T-test
Category Per for Values
Number Category Source Topic
1 43 +0.89 +0.77 3:626 Tb
2 13 -0.15 -7.00
3 9 -2.67 -7.33 N.S.
4 3 +-1.37 -17.00
5 17 -2.41 +15.88 3.333 Tb
6 25 -1.28 +8.08
7 11 +2.00 +3.27 2.109 S&
8 20 -1.55 -0.80
9 17 +9.06 -1.95 N.S.
10 19 +12.15 -1.37
11 7 +7.00 -3.63 2,180 T&
12 13 +9.31 -9.47
13 19 +8.79 +10.31 N.S.
14 8 +13.45 +11.87
15 18 +8.17 -0.30 N.S.
16 17 +7.77 -0.97
T = Difference due to expectancy significant on Topic comparison.
S = Difference due to expectancy significant on Source comparison.
^.05 level of confidence.
b.Ol level of confidence.
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response profiles is discussed at length in other sources and will not 
be discussed here. This is the same statistic discussed above concerning 
Tannenbaum and Bettinghaus' direct comparison of attitude change toward 
source with attitude change toward topic; however, it should be noted 
that the use of the D-score at this point in this study is not incon­
sistent with the discussion of the measure above. This study questioned 
using the D-score between different concepts (source and topic). This 
study will use the D-score within concepts of source and topic. As 
discussed earlier, the bases for this procedure are much more concrete.
The use of D-scores within concepts leaves only the question of comparing 
attitude change across subjects (i.e., does the semantic differential
scale unit vary from one person or group to the next?). Considerable
evidence exists to illustrate that scale units of the semantic differ­
ential do not vary significantly across subjects or groups drawn from a 
common parent population.^
It should also be noted that D-score analysis is not unrelated to
the correlation coefficient "r. However, £  gives only information der
scribing how two sets of data vary in a serial relation. It gives no 
estimate of the "distance" between two profiles. D-score, on the other
hand, gives an estimate of this distance component.
An hypothesis of this study (Hypothesis II-A) suggests that expec­
tancy will produce different amounts and/or directions of attitude change 
toward source depending upon whether it is confirmed or disconfirmed. 
Illustration 2 provides graphic illustration of differences in attitude
^Osgood, Tannenbaum and Suci, The Measurement of Meaning, p. 170 ff.
^Webster, Psychological Bulletin, XLIX, 539.
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change for the four conditions of expectancy. To analyze the data 
relative to this hypothesis, the D-score analysis was applied to the mean 
attitude change profile of the four different expectancy conditions (F-F, 
0-F, F-0, 0-0) across the four combinations of preattitudes toward source 
and topic used in this study (S+T+, S+T-, S-T+, S-T-). Table 6 
summarizes the results of the D-score analysis. The table compares each 
profile with every other profile and the relative size of the number 
represents the relative distance between compared profiles.
TABLE 6
D-SCORE VALUES FOR ATTITUDE CHANGE TOWARD SOURCE ACROSS THE FOUR
EXPECTANCY PROFILES
(0-F) (F-0) (0-0)
Expected Favorable 
Assertion
Perceived Favorable 
Assertion (F-F)
5.85 5.99 1.43*
Expected Assertion 
to Oppose
Perceived Favorable 
Assertion (0-F)
8.46 6.55
Expected Assertion 
to Favor
Perceived Opposing 
Assertion (F-0) 5.87
^The relative similarity of the two confirmed expectancy cate­
gories is readily apparent.
The relatively large D-score values indicate expectancy had con­
siderable differentiating effects on attitude change toward the source. 
Illustration 2 provides a graphic illustration of the profiles compared
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by this analysis.
The rationale developed in Chapter III of this study theorized 
that only two of the three factors affecting attitude change were 
operative in changing attitude toward the source. The two factors were 
expectancy and incongruity. Since incongruity is a function of preatti­
tude toward source and topic, its effect should be constant across the 
profiles shown in Illustration 2. Moreover, since expectancy does not 
affect attitude toward the source when it is confirmed, the two confirmed 
expectancy profiles should be very similar and close together (see 
Hypothesis II-B). This expected similarity between confirmed expectancy 
profiles can be observed in Illustration 2 and is reflected by the 
relatively small D-score value for these two profiles in Table 6.
While the profiles for confirmed expectancies are very similar 
despite the direction of assertion, inspection of Table 6 and Illustra­
tion 2 indicates that the disconfirmed profiles differ from each other 
as well as from confirmed expectancy profiles.
Tentatively, "the results of the D-score analysis support Hypotheses 
II-A and II-B, i.e., attitude change toward source is different when 
recipient expectancies are confirmed than when disconfirmed, and atti­
tude change toward the source is the same when expectancies are confirmed, 
despite the direction of the assertions.
Within the concept of topic, t-tests applied between category 
pairs yields significance beyond the .05 level in three of the eight 
comparisons (see Illustration 3). While three of eight significant 
differences are slightly more than would be expected by chance, the 
statistical significance is not consistent enough across the four
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combinations of preattitudes to strongly support Hypothesis II-C.
Hypothesis II-C suggests that disconfirmed expectancies will 
result in the assertion being less effective in changing attitudes toward 
the topic. Owing to the lack of statistical significance, this hypo­
thesis is not fully supported; however. Illustration 3 shows the trend 
to be in the predicted direction in 6 of the 8 comparisons. This trend 
in the results will be discussed in the next chapter.
The D-score analysis was applied to the mean attitude change 
toward source. The D-values are summarized in Table 7 and indicate 
the lessening effect disconfirmed expectancy has on attitude change 
toward the topic.
TABLE 7
D-SCORE VALUES FOR ATTITUDE CHANGE TOWARD THE TOPIC 
ACROSS THE FOUR EXPECTANCY PROFILES
(0-F) (F-0) (0-0)
Recipient expects Favorable 
Assertion and Perceives 
Favorable Assertion (F-F)
11.65 18.78 27.42
Recipient expects Opposing 
Assertion and Perceives 
Favorable Assertion (0-F)
13.22 20.21
Recipient expects Favorable 
Assertion and Perceives 
Opposing Assertion (F-0)
11.72
The final result of this study to be reported is the efficiency 
of the directional predictive model of attitude change. This model was 
based on the intuitive assumption that the three major factors in attitude
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change (expectancy, incongruity, and preattitude combinations) would 
have equal effect on attitude change. Apparently this assumption was 
not valid. Illustration 2 shows that attitude change toward source was 
mostly positive, i.e., most attitude changes are toward the favorable 
poles of the semantic differential, while attitude changes toward the 
topic were about equal in both directions.
The predictive model correctly predicted mean attitude change in 
26 of the 32 cases (see Table 8). Also, when the predictions were tested 
on the basis of individual recipient responses, the model was considerably 
more successful than Tannenbaum's predictions of Bettinghaus' results; 
however, because expectancy, incongruity, and assertion seem variable 
in their respective potentials for affecting attitude change, it seems 
that a directional predictive model (like that posited in this study) 
would be accurate only in certain situations, and would not be 
generalizable. Because of this, the directional model in this study is 
offered more as a summary of the results obtained than a set of pre^ 
dictions. This model will be discussed in the following chapter.
Conclusions
From the results obtained in this study, the following conclu­
sions can be drawn.
1. Expectancy, as defined by this study, is not predictable from 
measures of preattitudes toward source and topic. A recipient's expec­
tancy of the position a source will support in an assertion is quite 
independent of the recipient's attitude toward the source and the topic 
of the assertion. This conclusion also has good face validity. If a 
person had favorable attitude toward President Johnson, but did not
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TABLE 8
SUMMARY OF EFFICIENCY OF MODEL IN PREDICTING DIRECTION OF 
ATTITUDE CHANGE OF THE EXPERIMENTAL POPULATION
Category
Number
Predicted
Attitude
Change
Mean 
Obtained 
Attitude Change
Per Cent of 
Correct Predictions 
at Individual 
Level
N Source Topic Source Topic Source Topii
1 43 + (L) + (L) -K).78 +1.46 56.2 60.6
2 13 + a ) - (s) -0.08 -7.00 36.3 66.6
3 9 - - -2.67 -7.33 66.6 66.6
4 3 + as) - +1.37 -17.00 66.6 100.0
5 17 - + -2.41 +15.88 69.0 100.0
6 25 - + -1.28 +8.08 59.0 83.3
7 11 + a) + (S) +2.00 +3.27 70.0 60.0
8 20 - (S) -  a) -1.55 -0.80 55.5 63.1
9 17 + + as) 49.06 -1.95 88.2 73.3
10 19 + - (s) +12.15 -1.37 89.3 47.0
11 7 + + a) +7.00 -3.63 80.0 00.0
12 12 + - +9.31 -9.47 100.0 84.6
13 19 - as) + +8.79 +10.31 05.5 82.3
14 8 + + +13.45 +11.87 100.0 100.0
15 18 + + (S) +8.17 -0.30 93.7 30.7
16 17 + (S) - (L) +7.77 -0.97 93.7 41.1
L = If more extreme attitudes could be attained, the semantic 
differential could not measure them due to scale limitations.
S = Change expected to be relatively slight due to the cancelling 
effect of the affective factors.
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approve of his "war on poverty" program, he would still expect the 
President to favor the program because Johnson is publicly and popularly 
identified with the program.
2. Different expectancies cause different amount and/or directions 
of attitude change toward the source and topic of a communication event.
3. When recipient expectancies are confirmed, the direction 
supported by the assertion has little effect on attitude change toward 
the source.
CHAPTER VI 
DISCUSSION
Discussion of results. This study was designed to test the 
effects of expectancy and congruity across a broad field of source and 
topic combinations. To accomplish this goal, the sources and topics and 
directions of assertions were systematically varied to provide as broad 
a range of source-topic combinations as possible. The attempt to broaden 
the nature of the communication stimulus undoubtedly sacrified some statis­
tical precision by limiting the number of cases and increasing variance 
within categories; however, the relatively inconsistent results of prior 
studies suggest that a limited investigation does not provide much 
generalizability.^ For a comparison of the predictive models discussed, 
see Figure 7.
The results of this study indicate several instances relative to 
recipient expectancies in communication that have not been accounted for 
in earlier studies. As indicated in Chapter V, expectancy is (1) a 
factor in accounting for variations in attitude change toward sources and 
topics, and (2) expectancy cannot be predicted with accuracy from pre­
tested recipient attitudes toward the source and topic of a given 
communication situation.
^See Chapter II, p. 25.
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FIGURE 7
SUMMARY OF PREDICTIONS AND RESULTS OF THE PRESENT STUDY. BETTINGHAUS, AND TANNENBAUM. 
A COMPARISON OF THEORIES WHICH DEAL WITH THE COMMUNICATION SITUATION.
Cate­
gory
Number
Categories
Preattitudes Assertion 
Source Topic Expect Perceive
This 
Study's 
Predictions^ 
Source Topic
This 
Study's 
Results 
Source Topic
Tannenbaum's 
Predictions^ 
Source Topic
Bettinghaus 
Results^ 
Source Topic
: 1 + + F F + + + + + +
2 + + 0 F + - - -
3 + + F 0 - - - - - - - -
4 + + 0 0 + - + -
5 + F F _ - +
6 + - G F - + - + - + - +
7 + - F G + + +
8 + - 0 0 - - - - + - - +
9 _ + F F + + + _
10 - + 0 F + - + - + - + -
11 - + F 0 + + + -
12 - + 0 0 + - "b - - + + -
13 F F + + + - + +
14 - - G F + + + +
15 - - F G + + + - + + + +
16 - - 0 0 + - +
VÛ
&See Figure 3, p. 26. 
^See Table 6, p. 85.
^See The Measurement of Meaning, op. cit.. p. 211 for complete model. (This column represents 
Tannenbaum's results as wellT.as predictions since both are the same.
^Bettinghaus based his study on Tannenbaum's predictions.
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These findings tend to limit the generalizability of the congruity 
principle formulated by Tannenbaum. The Bettinghaus study also tends 
to suggest that Tannenbaum's results are relatively limited. On the 
other hand, a study by Bowers who analyzed data from a study with
2
different original purpose, shows agreement with Tannenbaum's theory. 
Bowers’ study replicates only two of 18 categories (S+T+, positive asser­
tion; S+T+, negative assertion) originally proposed by Tannenbaum, but 
he reports attitude changes resulting from oral communication (taped 
recording) to be consistent with Tannenbaum's predictions.
Although much more limited, Bower's study is very similar to 
Tannenbaum's study in that both used similar sources, i.e., Tannenbaum's 
were "Labor Leaders," "The Chicago Tribune," and "Senator Robert Taft"; 
Bowers' were "A retired Eastern College President," " A prominent home 
economist," "A mid-western College President," and "A United States 
Senator." On the other hand, Bettinghaus and the present study used only 
specific individuals, i.e., Bettinghaus' sources were college students 
speaking "in person," and the present study used alleged real sources-- 
Robert Welch, Robert Baker, Scott Carpenter, and Robert McNamara. This 
difference in sources is one possible explanation of the different trends 
in results. The four studies also used three different communication 
channels, i.e., Tannenbaum used written communication, this study and 
the Bowers' study used taped recordings, and Bettinghaus studied the 
live or face-to-face situation. The differences in topics (or "concepts" 
as Tannenbaum and Bowers call them) are too numerous to ennumerate. Any
^J. Bowers, "The Congruity Principle and Oral Communication," 
Central States Speech Journal. XIV (May, 1963), 88-91.
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one or an interaction of all of these differences might explain the 
differences in results. Also, several other variables, such as delivery 
techniques, experimental population differences, etc., could be major 
affective factors which have been relatively uncontrolled and unaccounted 
for. And, of course, this study has shown how expectancy can effect 
attitude change resulting from communication.
The general conclusion to be drawn from the discussion above is 
that directional predictive models are now inadequate for predicting 
attitude change resulting from communication. This inadequacy is vividly 
displayed in the summary of results and/or predictive models summarized 
in Figure 7. It now appears that more factors affecting attitude change 
in communication such as source credibility, media and recipient expec­
tancy, as well as preattitudes and assertion direction, need to be taken 
into account before attitude change can be accurately predicted in most 
situations. In this respect, the trends of this study's results may 
be useful.
The first and most striking trend in this study's results is found 
in attitude change toward the source. As indicated in Chapter V of this 
study, attitude change toward the source seems predominantly reliant upon 
expectancy and the incongruity caused by opposing preattitudes toward the 
source and topic. Illustration 2 and Table 6 show the close relation of 
attitude change toward the source in confirmed expectancy cases, despite 
the direction of the assertion. Illustration 2 graphically illustrates 
when preattitudes toward source and topic are both favorable (S+T+) and 
expectations are confirmed (F-F, 0-0) only slight attitude change toward 
source is seen (as predicted). In cases of favorable attitudes toward
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source, unfavorable attitudes toward topic in which expectancies were 
confirmed, attitude toward the source is shifted negatively, as pre- 
dicted--theoretically due to the incongruity produced by the opposing 
attitudes. Similarly, in cases of unfavorable attitude toward source and 
favorable attitude toward topic in which expectancy is confirmed, atti­
tude change toward the source shifts positively as predicted. In cases 
of unfavorable attitude toward both source and topic in which expectancy 
is confirmed, the direction of assertion still has no differentiating 
effect between confirmed expectancies, but the amount of attitude change 
for both is significantly positive. The positive mean attitude change 
of this final preattitude group (S-T-) is not provided for in the 
rationale of this study. If the variables affecting attitude toward 
source were, in fact, pure variables, attitude change toward source in 
this preattitude group should have been near zero. Despite the positive 
attitude change in the S-T- preattitude group, the hypothesis that 
direction of assertion would have no differentiating effect between cases 
of confirmed expectancy is supported.
Another rather consistent trend in attitude change toward source 
is the effect of favorable or unfavorable disconfirmed expectancy. The 
rationale of the study provided that when recipients expected their 
original attitudes toward the topic to be opposed by the source, but per­
ceived an assertion which agreed with their original attitude, the atti­
tude shift toward the source would be more favorable (or less unfavorable) 
than for those subjects whose expectancies were confirmed. This trend 
is present in three of four possible comparisons. Conversely, this 
study expected unfavorable disconfirmed expectancies, (i.e., recipient's
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expecting support of their original attitudes toward the topic, but per­
ceiving opposition) to result in more unfavorable (or less favorable) 
shifts in attitude toward the source. This trend, also was observed in 
three, of four comparisons.
Generally, in six of eight comparisons, disconfirmed expectancies 
resulted in more favorable or less favorable attitude shifts toward the 
source as discussed above; however, only one instance provided statisti­
cal significance (see Table 5). The computation of D-scores for dimen.- 
sions of expectancy across all source-topic preattitude groups indicated 
that disconfirmed expectancies varied widely from the confirmed expectancy 
dimensions, but the greatest D-score value was obtained between the two 
different disconfirmed dimensions (see Table 6).
The effect of recipient expectancies on attitude toward the source 
has interesting implications for further research. Based on correlate 
findings in the level of aspiration and other expectancy studies, expec­
tancy in communication might be a function of demonstrated variables 
such as attitude intensity, ego-involvement, or source credibility. 
Controlled experimental studies could easily determine such questions.
A second consistent trend in the results of this study concerns 
attitude change toward the topic. This study hypothesized that discon­
firmed expectancies would decrease the amount of attitude change induced 
by the assertion. In other words, if the assertion did not confirm the 
recipient's expectancy, it would be less effective. Again, statistical 
significance was not adequate to support the hypothesis, but the trend 
was present (see Illustration 3). In.six of eight possible comparisons 
the trend was in the predicted direction--three of the eight comparisons
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were, statistically significant. While the statistical significance of 
this trend is not sufficient to support the hypothesis, the results are 
consistent with the results of the Ewing study (discussed in Chapter II, 
p. 36).
A third consistency in this study's results complements the 
findings of the Bettinghaus study. In categories of opposing recipient 
preattitudes toward source and topic, (S+T- or S-T+), the attitudes each 
shifted in the direction of the other regardless of assertion direction. 
This also was the case in Bettinghaus' study even in cases where one atti­
tude was directional (favorable or unfavorable) and the other neutral.
Such an occurence is in direction opposition to some prediction of Tannen­
baum's congruity principle (see Figure 7). The moving together of source 
and topic attitudes supports one of three theoretical premises this study 
proposed, i.e., that opposing attitude toward source and topic will change 
in a central fashion when combined and perceived in a communication 
event. While this premise was not put to a rigorous test, the tendency 
in six of eight categories supports a similar tendency in Bettinghaus' 
results.
A fourth notable consistency of the results supports the third 
major premise of this study, i.e., assertion strength. In all situations 
where expectancy or incongruity were not expected to interfere with the 
influence of the assertion, the attitude change toward the topic was 
in the direction advocated by the assertion.
Summarizing the three factors which this study assumed accounted 
for most of the attitude change in communication, the following observa­
tions should be made: (1) expectancy had the expected effect on attitude
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changes toward sources and topics in 12 out of 16 possible compari­
sons, and (2) incongruity (the central shifting of opposing attitudes) 
can be seen in six of eight categories in which preattitudes are opposed 
(categories 5-12) regardless of differences in expectancy and assertion 
direction (as such, this factor seems to be the most "powerful" of the 
three); the assertion is successful in changing attitude toward the topic 
in the direction intended in every category which is not otherwise affected 
by expectancy or incongruity (categories, 1, 4, 13, 16).
Most of the attitude change occurring in this study can be attri­
buted to the three factors of expectancy, incongruity, and assertion.
The one area of attitude change these factors cannot account for is the 
positive attitude change toward unfavorable sources (see Table 3). In 
eight categories (9-16) in which preattitude toward the source was 
unfavorable, attitude shift toward the source was favorable and the 
shifts were significant in seven of the categories. Some of the cate­
gories had been predicted to shift positively; however, the amount of 
shift seen in these categories is extreme, relative to the other cate­
gories. Differences in the sources which were typically favorable 
(McNamara and Carpenter) or unfavorable (Welch and Baker) may have helped 
cause such divergent attitude shifts, but this study provides no means 
for analyzing them. Essentially the same trend is observable in the 
results of Bettinghaus (see Figure 3).
Notes on testing procedure. The successful administration of the 
psychological measures utilized by this study depended upon the success- ,
ful deception of the experimental subjects concerning several aspects of 
the study. The primary need for successful deception concerned the
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recipients' acceptance of the recorded press releases as authentic. If, 
for any reason, the experimental recipients had suspected the press 
releases had been simulated, a serious question concerning the validity 
of their responses would be raised.
The only opportunity the recipients had to indicate their feelings 
or doubts concerning the press releases was in the identification sheet 
which was attached to the back of each test booklet in both testing 
sessions. On the identification sheet a space was provided for the reci­
pients' written response to the statement, "Please comment on your im­
pressions of this questionnaire." Most of the subjects indicated some 
response--none of the subjects questioned the authenticity of the press 
releases. Some indication of the success in deceiving the subjects was 
observed in the remarks of two senior psychology majors who criticized 
the testing situation at some length, but never questioned the press 
releases. Also, following the completion of the second testing session, 
many of the subjects (including radio and journalism majors) expressed 
their delight in hearing the unedited, recorded press releases.
Following the completion of testing sessions, a brief summary of 
the purpose of the study was given to the instructors of the classes used 
for the experimental population. In every case, students were reported 
surprised to discover that the press releases were not authentic.
As mentioned previously in Chapter III, some effort was made to 
disassociate the first testing session with the second testing session 
in the minds of the recipients. This procedure was similar to the pro­
cedure Tannenbaum used in his original study. The procedures to 
disassociate the two testing sessions included telling the subjects that
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the two "surveys" had different origins, the nature of the testing pro­
cedure was different in the two situations (i.e., dogmatism was measured 
in the first session, expectancy was measured in the second; no communi­
cation was heard in the first session, etc.), the covers on the booklets 
used in the two sessions were different, etc. The success of disassocia­
ting the two testing sessions was not vital to the success of the study; 
however, apparently the efforts were successful in disassociating the 
sessions since only one student made any reference to the first session 
in the written remarks at the end of the second session. The one student 
who referred to the earlier sessiap arrived late in both testing sessions, 
thereby missing the instruction delivered orally by the experimenter in 
both sessions. Her comments were to the effect that she "didn't under­
stand what she was supposed to do in this test any better than she had 
in the earlier one." Her responses were not included in the analyses.
The design of this study required that each subject/s first test 
booklet be matched with his second test test booklet so that attitude 
change could be computed by subtracting his postest attitude score from 
the pretest attitude score on the same concepts. The subjects were not 
required to put their names on the identification sheet of the two test 
booklets, but they were asked to give the other information asked for 
(age, major, sex, etc.). In cases where the subjects did not indicate 
their names, their test booklets were matched by matching the information 
they did provide and by matching the handwriting in the "remarks" space. 
This matching of booklets was not difficult since never more than seven 
persons in each class omitted their names. Also, those persons who did 
omit their names were usually the same persons who made the most
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extensive written comments on the testing procedures, thereby making the 
matching via handwriting quite easy. In the few cases where first 
session and second session booklets could not be matched with certainty, 
the booklets were discarded and the responses not used in the analysis.
The semantic differential. For purposes like those of this Study, 
the semantic differential provides a convenient, easily-scored, readily 
explained, generalized measure of attitude; however, because of polar 
limitations and an undefined neutral area of attitude some difficulties 
are encountered. As discussed briefly in several places in this study 
(see Chapter IV, Appendix A and Chapter III), certain observations were 
made concerning the use of the semantic differential.
The first observation concerns the polar limits of the scales 
making up the semantic differential. This limitation is suggested by 
Tannenbaum in formulating his predictive model and it was most apparent 
in the present study in the F-ratio analysis (see Chapter IV). The 
F-ratio analysis (the variance test, see Table 4) indicates the two 
categories comparisons where variance varied significantly in attitude 
change toward the topic (categories 1-2, 7-8). The category comparisons 
are similar in aspects to be discussed here; therefore the categories 1 
and 2 will be used to provide an example. Within category 1, the mean 
pretested attitude toward the topic was 35.21 (highest possible is 42). 
The preattitude toward the topic in this category is already quite posi­
tive or favorable; however, the postest mean was 36.67 indicating a 
further shift of attitude in a positive direction. For those subjects 
who registered a score of 42 on the pretest of attitudes, it was not 
possible to indicate a positive attitude change; therefore, if, in fact,
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their attitudes did shift in a positive direction, the limitations of 
the scale would result in a postest score of 42 also even if a more 
extreme attitude was created. The limiting effect would be similar for 
all subjects who registered a relatively high or favorable attitude on 
the pretest and the statistical result would be a relatively smaller 
variance (S2) among the postest scores. This smaller variance on the 
postest would result, also, in a smaller variance of I-scores (pretest 
minus postest scores for each individual subject). In the case of cate­
gory 1, the I-score variance was 21.43. On the other hand, in category 
2, the mean pretest score was 31.31. This score also is positive or 
favorable; however, attitude scores in this category shifted negatively 
(or toward the unfavorable pole) with a mean postest score of 26.31.
By shifting in a negative direction, attitude changes were not limited 
by scale dimensions and the I-score variance in category 2 would be 
expected expected to be greater than in category 1. This expectation is 
supported by this example, with the I-score variance for category 2 
being 132.66. The difference in variance between the categories is 
obvious and also, is significant beyond the .02 level of confidence.
The example situation above does not constitute conclusive evi­
dence that attitude; changeais being limited by the semantic differential 
scales; however, conditions for both category pairs show significant 
F-ratios in this study and suggest this possibility.
The limitation of scales discussed above with reference to variance 
might also affect statistical analysis of attitude change. If the pre­
attitude scores are quite extreme in a pretesting session, the amount 
of change might be sufficiently limited by scale dimensions to obscure
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a statistical indication of change.
Implications for future research. From observations made during 
this study the following questions seem to represent areas in which 
further research might be profitably pursued.
1. Could the effect of expectancy on attitude change be better 
predicted by an expectancy measure which would allow relative amounts of 
expectancy to be indicated (e.g., expect extremely favorable assertion, 
expect slightly favorable assertion, expect slightly opposing assertion, 
expect extremely opposing assertion)?
2. Is expectancy operative in determining a recipient's percep­
tion of an assertion from high and low credibility sources?
3. Is ego-involvement an important correlate of expectancy? In 
other words, would a faithful Democrat have a more intense expectancy of 
a Democratic leader's speech than a person who was not greatly interested 
in politics?
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APPENDIX A
REPORT ON TWO PILOT STUDIES OF EXPECTANCY AND VALIDATION 
OF THE EXPECTANCY MEASURING INSTRUMENT
The studies of incongruity conducted by Tannenbaum and Bettinghaus 
(see Chapter II) both infer recipient expectancy from measures of the 
recipient's preattitudes toward source and topic. Such a procedure dictates 
the following set of assumptions:
1. Favorable sources are expected to assert in favor of favorable
topics.
2. Favorable sources are expected to assert in opposition to 
unfavorable topics.
3. Unfavorable sources are expected to assert in favor of 
unfavorable topics.
4. Unfavorable sources are expected to assert in opposition to 
favorable topics.
"Favorable" and "unfavorable" refer to the recipients' attitudes toward 
each source and each topic before they are combined in a single communi­
cation situation. The source and topic attitudes are measured via the 
semantic differential without being related to each other in any meaning­
ful fashion.
On a logical basis, numerous example situations can be suggested 
in which expectancy would not necessarily adhere to the four situations 
dictated by the assumption discussed above. For example, would John F. 
Kennedy favor federal aid to parochial schools because he is a Catholic
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or would he oppose the federal aid in order to hold the Southern Protes­
tant vote? In such cases, expectancy would appear to be contingent with 
factors other than the recipient's attitudes toward Kennedy and federal 
aid to parochial schools.
On the basis of such logical observations, two pilot studies were 
conducted. The first study was designed to determine if recipient 
expectancy was, in fact, uniform for all recipients whose attitudes toward 
a source and a topic were similar. The second study was designed to 
validate an expectancy measuring instrument.
The first pilot study used 23 students in a beginning speech class 
at the University of Oklahoma. The students were given an attitude test 
(the semantic differential) on which they indicated their attitudes toward 
four sources and four topics. The topics used in the study were: (1)
prayer in the public schools, (2) women in the business world, (3) segre­
gation of the southern states, and (4) federal aid to education. The 
four sources were: (1) Jack Parr, (2) Harry Truman, (3) John Blaken (a
fictitious name), and (4) Bud Wilkinson (the former Oklahoma University 
football coach). The semantic differential attitude measure consisted 
of four experimental scales (pleasant-unpleasant, favorable-unfavorable, 
fair-unfair, and honorable-dishonorable) and three "filler" scales 
(passive-active, big-little, extited-calm). Only the experimental scales 
were used in the analysis. The four experimental scales provided a 
possible range of scores from 4-28. This range of possible scores was 
arbitrarily divided into unfavorable attitudes (4-11), "neutral" atti­
tudes (12-17), and favorable attitudes (18-24). The "neutral" position 
on the semantic differential is defined as "equally associated with both
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sides of the scale," or "completely irrelevant, unrelated to the concept." 
Because of this multi-purpose definition, the neutral attitudes were not 
included in the analysis (this exclusion of neutral attitudes will be 
discussed in more detail below in relation to the source "John Blake"). 
Following the administration of the attitude test, the four sources and 
four topics were matched in all possible combinations. This procedure 
produced 16 source-topic pairs, each of which was a possible communica­
tion situation.
Two days after the administration of the attitude test, the 16 
source-topic combinations were inserted into', the following format and 
given to the same group of experimental subjects:
The position on the scale I would expect (source) to support when
speaking on the topic of (topic) is:
Favor :____ :____ :______:__ :_____ :____ Oppose
On the basis of their preattitudes toward the sources and topics, the 
experimental subjects were assigned to four attitude classifications, i.e., 
favorable toward source-favorable toward topic (S+T+), favorable toward 
source unfavorable toward topic (S+T-), unfavorable toward source- 
favorable toward topic (S-T+), and unfavorable toward source-unfavorable 
toward topic (S-T-). The sixteen source-topic combinations for each of 
23 subjects resulted in only 126 cases of source-topic attitude combina­
tions which fit one of the attitude classifications of favorable toward 
source-favorable toward the topic, favorable toward the source-unfavorable 
the topic, etc.
Analysis of the data consisted in determining what percentage of 
the subjects in each attitude classification (S+T+, S+T-, S-T+, S-T-) 
adhered to the assumption that recipients expect favored sources to
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favor favored topics, etc. This analysis revealed that over 30 percent 
of the subjects did not adhere to this set of assumptions thereby pro­
viding some evidence that this set of assumptions was not valid.
In several cases, the number of responses which violated the basic 
assumption exceeded the number that coincided with the assumption (i.e., 
recipients who liked Parr and liked federal aid to education resulted in 
11 students violating Tannenbaum's assumptions and only three subjects 
adhering to them).
Because of the ambiguity inherent in the neutral position oni the 
semantic differential scales, the fictitious source, John Blake, was 
included in this pilot study. The primary purpose of this procedure was 
to determine a "typical" response for a source the recipients were not 
familiar with. The fictitious name was to determine if the recipients 
(who were in a class-room situation) would fake an attitude toward an 
unknown source rather than admit their ignorance. The results indicated 
that 20 of the 23 subjects indicated a straight median response (i.e., 
marked the middle position on all scales) which, according to the in­
structions given them (see Appendix C) indicated they either did not 
know who John Blake was or that the scales were irrelevant.
As a precaution, after the students had completed the attitude 
test booklet, they were asked to indicate on the back of the booklet 
what position each of the sources occupied or what he was best known 
for. The three subjects who had indicated an attitude toward John Blake 
gave the following responses:
1. "An eighteenth century poet." (Probably confused with William 
Blake, 1757-1827.)
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2. "The head of an anti-communist society." (John Birch?)
3. "A newscaster." (?)
The other subjects admitted their ignorance of John Blake's identity and 
all.subjects were correct in identifying the other three sources.
Two interesting observations were made during this pilot study 
which should be mentioned here. The first observation was that despite 
the fact that 20 of the subjects had indicated a straight neutral response 
toward John Blake, all but one of the subjects indicated an expectancy 
of John Blake two days later on the expectancy scale discussed above.
All of the estimates of the "position on the scale I would expect John 
Blake to support . . . "  were in the "3" or "5" positions (i.e., one 
position either side of the middle position "4") and the judgments were 
almost equal in their frequency in each of the positions (40 responses in 
position 3, 36 responses in position 5). The pressure of the classroom 
situation to make a choice, or an inability to conceive a source making 
an assertion that was neutral, or the measuring device was not valid 
are but three of several possible explanations for this observed 
behavior. However, this observation led to omitting neutral attitudes 
in the analysis reported in the main text of this work.
The second observation was that the neutral position provided on 
the expectancy measure used in this first pilot study was apparently not 
meaningful or useful to the subjects; therefore, the neutral position was 
not included in the second version of the expectancy measure which wi*lT 
be discussed in the second pilot study reported below.
Because of the high number of subjects who did not conform to the 
expectancy assumptions of Tannenbaum's congruity principle and because
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of the expectancy indicated for the unknown source (John Blake), some 
suspicion arose concerning the validity of the expectancy measure used 
in the first pilot study. Was the instrument measuring expectancy or was 
it being randomly marked by the subjects?
To determine the validity of the expectancy measure, a second 
pilot study was conducted. This study used 27 members of a beginning 
speech class at the University of Oklahoma. Again, four sources and four 
topics were submitted to the subjects via the semantic differential.
The four sources used were: (1) Robert "Bobby" Kennedy, (2) Harry Truman,
(3) Jack Parr, and (4) Richard "Dick" Nixon. The four topics used were:
(1) sale of wheat to Russia, (2) the integration of the southern states, 
(3) the Peace Corps, and (4) prayer in the public schools.
The scales used by the semantic differential to measure the atti­
tudes were a combination of the scales used by Tannenbaum and Bettinghaus
and were the same scales used in the study reported in the main text of
this work.
As in the first pilot study, all possible combinations of sources
and topics were inserted in the following format:
If (source) was to issue a press release concerning (feopic). I 
would expect him to (check one below) the topic.
______ Favor
______ Oppose
In this study over 35 percent of the expectancy judgments did not adhere 
to the expectancy principles of Tannenbaum's congruity principle.
From the 16 source-topic combinations used in the expectancy 
measure above, four source-topic pairs were chosen. They were: (1) 
Kennedy on the sale of wheat, (2) Truman on segregation, (3) Parr on the
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Peace Corps, and (4) Nixon on prayer in schools. Twelve statements
representing arguments for and against each of the topics (six for, six
against) were composed and validated (discussed below). The statements
were randomly ordered for each topic and submitted to the students with
the following preface of instruction printed at the top of the page;
In (source's) statement about the (topic), I would expect that 
some of the following arguments or statements are likely to 
appear: (circle the ones you think he will most likely use.)
The results of this procedure showed that with 100 percent reliability,
the subjects who indicated they expected a source to favor a topic in
the expectancy measure, chose only from among the arguments which favored
the topic. Conversely, the subjects who had expected the source to oppose
the topic chose only from the statements which opposed the topic.
The procedures and results of the two pilot studies seem to pro­
vide adequate evidence to support the assumption that the scale was, 
in fact, measuring "real" recipient expectancy of an assertion.
The validity test of the statements used in the final stage of 
the second pilot study was accomplished by submitting the 48 statements 
(twelve for each of four topics) to a group of eight graduate students 
at the University of Oklahoma. The students were asked to indicate 
which statements favored their topic and which statements opposed their 
topic. Forty-six of the statements received 100 percent reliable 
ratings in terms of favoring or opposing the topic. Two statements were 
deemed ambiguous (two of the students each picked one statement which 
they thought ambiguous) and were not included in the analysis for 
validating the expectancy measure.
The two pilot studies described above provide the rationale for
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assuming that:
1. The expectancy measuring device used in the second study is, 
in fact, measuring the expectancy a recipient has of an assertion prior 
to actually hearing the assertion, and;
2. The assumptions of expectancy subscribed to by Tannenbaum's 
congruity principle are sufficiently in doubt to merit further and more 
extensive testing.
APPENDIX B
A COMPARISON OF SUBJECTS' SCORES ON ROKEACH'S DOGMATISM TEST 
WITH EXPECTANCY OF AN ASSERTION
Following the pilot Studies discussed on page 28 and in Appendix A, 
which indicate that recipients do not always expect sources they favor 
to speak favorably on topics the recipient favors, etc., several questions 
were raised. What are the factors involved in a recipient's expectancy 
of a favored source opposing a favored topic? Is the expectancy contin­
gent withtthe attitude toward the source or the attitude toward the topic 
or both? Does it take a special type of person to always expect a 
favored source to speak favorably toward a favorable topic?
To provide conclusive evidence for answering these questions, 
thorough and well controlled studies would have to be designed; however, 
because of the opportunity provided by the present study, it was suggested 
that a preliminary test might be made. Specifically, the suggestion 
posed the possibility that persons who always expected a favored source 
to favor a favorable topic might be "authority oriented" persons. The 
authority oriented person has been discussed by Rokeach as one factor 
which identifies dogmatic or closed minded personality traits. Rokeach 
states :
The more closed the system, the more is the acceptance of a parti­
cular belief assumed to depend on irrelevant internal drives and/or 
arbitrary reinforcements from external authority. The relation 
among beliefs should depend on such irrelevant considerations 
rather than on considerations of logical consistency. Isolation 
between parts reflects a tendency not to relate beliefs to the
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inner requirements of logical consistency, but to assimilate 
them wholesale, as fed by one's authority figure.^
Reducing this authoritarian personality concept to the context of 
this study, an hypothesis predicting that attitudes toward the source and 
toward the topic are dictated by the expectation of the recipient would 
not be untenable in cases of authority dependent recipients. In other 
words, if a recipient views the source as an authority figure (which in 
this study is a reasonable assumption), that, source would be expected to 
"feed" the recipient an assertion which favored the favorable topic. 
Specifically the hypothesis would state: those recipients who expect
favored sources to favor favorable topics, unfavorable sources to favor 
unfavorable topics, favored sources to oppose unfavorable topics, and 
unfavorable sources to oppose favorable topics are likely to be relatively 
more dogmatic than recipients who are prone to deviate from such source 
and topic dictated expectancies.
The hypothesis requires some elaboration of Rokeach's theory and 
is based upon largely a priori reasoning. It necessitates the assumption 
that persons whose expectancies were not dictated by their attitudes toward 
the source and the topic are capable of tolerating an incongruous (or 
dissonant) situation. This paper is not the first instance of this parti­
cular hypothesis being suggested; however, the'other authors were guarded 
in their discussion and to some extent, at least discouraged it. Festinger 
is perhaps most explicit in his discussion. He states:
A person with a low tolerance for dissonance would, perhaps, be 
unable to maintain such dissonances and would struggle to eliminate 
them. Thus, one would expect that if a person with low tolerance
^Milton Rokeach, The Open and Closed Mind (New York: McGraw-
Hill Book Co., 1951), p. 61.
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for dissonance were a Democrat, he would show tendencies to accept 
everything the Democrats stood for. For such a person, then, 
cluster of relevant cognitive elements would be mainly consonant.
His opinions on issues might be characterized as extreme or as 
cast in terms of black and white. It would seem that a measure 
of 'tolerance for dissonance' based upon these considerations 
would be possible.
At this point many readers will feel like suggesting that per­
haps such a test already exists, having recognized a certain 
similarity between our discussion immediately above and some 
descriptions of 'authoritarian personalities' and some descrip­
tions of people with high 'intolerance for ambiguity.' My own 
suspicion would be that existing tests such as the F scale do 
measure, to some extent, the degree to which people hold extreme 
opinion, that is, opinions where dissonance has been effectively 
eliminated. Such tests also measure so many other things, however, 
that they would not be very satisfactory for this purpose.^
Here Festinger carefully points out the difference between his 
"tolerance for dissonance" and the trait commonly termed "openmindedness." 
While he recognizes that tests might be devised to measure his "openminded­
ness," none have yet been provided. Festinger, on the other hand, did not 
provide any/concrete evidence to support his supposition that the F-scale 
(or one of its derivatives) would be totally inefficient in detecting 
some difference.
Withstanding the "warning" of Festinger, this study wished to deter­
mine if recipients who violated Tannenbaum's set of assumptions (i.e., 
recipients expect favored sources to assert favorably on favored topics, 
etc.) were more openminded than recipients who adhered to the assumptions. 
The author realized that Form E of Rokeach's Dogmatism scale (a derivative 
of the F-scale) measured things other than the capacity for tolerating 
incongruity; however, it was assumed that this Dogmatism test had a 
sufficiently high loading in a ''capacity for tolerating incongruity" 
dimension to differentiate such subjects. Therefore, the Rokeach Form E
2
Festinger, A Theory of Cognitive Dissonance, p. 268.
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Dogmatism test was used as a measure of this "tolerance" in this study.
Several assumptions must be made before justifying such a proce­
dure. They are:
1. If a recipient does not expect a favored source to favor a 
favored topic (and the other combinations of congruity theory's basic 
assumption) the situation produces perceived incongruity.
2. Form E of Rokeach's Dogmatism Scale includes a sufficient 
loading on a "capacity for dissonance” dimension to show a difference 
between the recipients, who expect favored sources to favor favored 
topics and those who do not.
3. The experimental sources in this study to whom the assertions 
are attributed are perceived as authority sources by the experimental 
recipients.
With these assumptions, the Dogmatism test was administered to the 
experimental recipients following the attitude tests. During the second 
testing period of this study (see Chapter III, page 55) each recipient 
registered his expectancy of four communication situations. On the basis 
of each recipient's preattitudes toward the source and topic and the 
expectancy each recipient had of each communication situation, the 
experimental population was divided into those who complied with the 
"favored sources favor favored topics" prediction and those who did not 
comply.
The experimental population also was divided according to "high" 
or "low" scores on the dogmatism test. The extreme scores in the upper 
and lower quartiles of the dogmatism test were chosen for analysis. If 
chance factors only were active, one would expect an equal number of
125
recipients who violated the "favorable sources favor favorable topics" 
hypothesis to appear in both the "high" and "low" dogmatism quartiles.
Any apparent deviation from the fifty-fifty distribution could be tested 
by simple chi-square analysis.
Analysis of the data indicated that recipients who complied with 
the hypothesis of "favored sources favor favored topics" divided 38 and 
42 in parameters of "high" arid "low" dogmatism, respectively. Recipients 
who violated the hypothesis divided 25 and 25 in the two parameters.
The obvious adherence to the expected fifty-fifty distribution 
results in the conclusion the dogmatism and expectation have no 
noticeable or significant relationship under the experimental circum­
stances.
Reasons for this analysis' failure to differentiate between "high" 
and "low" dogmatics among the subjects subscribing to or violating the 
expectancy assumptions of Tannenbaum are numerous. If any one of the 
assumptions necessary for this analysis was invalid, the results obtained 
would be expected. If the assumptions are, in fact, valid, a conclusion 
that "capacity for incongruity" has no affect on expectation of an 
assertion is tenable.
APPENDIX C
INSTRUCTIONS FOR USING THE SEMANTIC DIFFERENTIAL PREATTITUDE TEST 
READ TO THE EXPERIMENTAL SUBJECTS PRIOR TO TESTING SESSION ONE
The purpose of this study is to measure the meaning of certain 
things and various people by having you judge these concepts using a series 
of descriptive scales. Please make your judgments on the basis of what 
these concepts mean ^  you. On the following pages of this booklet you 
will find several concepts and beneath each concept a set of scales. You 
are to judge the concept on each of these scales in order. Here is how 
you use the scales:
If you feel the concept (îK)THER) above each set of scales is 
extremely realted to one end of the scale, you should place your 
mark as follows:
MOTHER
Strong X : : : : : : Weak
or
Strong : : : : : : X Weak
If you feel that the concept is quite closely related
the other end of the scale you should place your mark
Smart : : : : : X : Dumb
or
Smart X : Dumb
If the concept seems only slightly related to one side
should mark:
Valid : : X : : : : Invalid
or
Valid : : : : X : : Invalid
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The direction toward which you check, of course, depends upon which 
of the two ends of the scale seems most characteristic of the 
thing you are judging.
If you consider the concept of judgment to be neutral on the 
scale, both sides of the scale equally associated with the 
concept, or if the scale is completely irrelevant, unrelated 
to the concept, then you should place your mark in the middle 
space :
Blue X ; Red
IMPORTANT: (1) Place your mark in the middle of the space, not
on the boundaries:
THIS 
: X
NOT THIS 
X
(2) Check every scale for every concept--do_not 
omit any scale.
(3) Do not put more than one mark on each scale.
As you make the judgments, work as rapidly as possible. Do not 
try to remember how you marked particular items or scales in prior judgments. 
Make each concept a separate and independent judgment. Do not worry or 
puzzle over individual scales. It is your first impression in which we 
are interested; however, do not be careless, we want true impressions.
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FOUR DIFFERENT SCALE ARRANGEMENTS OF THE SEMANTIC DIFFERENTIAL 
ATTITUDE MEASURE USED IN THIS STUDY^
Sample No. 1
Unfair_
Active
Dirty_
EmotionaI_
Tasty_
Calm_
Pleasant
Little_
Worthless
Reputable^
Pleas an t_ 
Big
Worthless^
Unemotional
Tasty_
Passive_
Fair
Disreputable:
Clean_
Excited
Sample No
_Fair
_Passive
Clean
_Unemotional
Distasteful
Excited
Unpleasant
_Big
Valuable
Disreputable
Unpleasant
Little
Valuable
Emotional
Distasteful
Active
_Unfair
Reputable
Dirty
Calm
Each set of scales and the concept to which they referred were on
separate pages of both testing session booklets.
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Sample No. 3
Distasteful^
Worthless^
Excited_
Dirty_
Unemotional_
Pleasant_
Active_
Unfair_
Reputable_
Big_
Clean_
Unemotional__
Unfair__
Big__
Distasteful__
Excited__
Reputable__
Passive__
Wothhless__
Unpleasant___
Sample No. 4
_Tksty
.Valuable
.Calm
Clean
Emotional
.Unpleasant
Passive
.Fair
.Disreputable
Little
.Dirty
Emotional
Fair
_Little
_Tasty
.Calm
.Disreputable
.Active
.Valuable
Pleasant
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ROKEACH DOGMATISM "TEST E" (FIRST TESTING SESSION)
Instructions
The following is a study of what the general public thinks and feels about 
a number of important social and personal questions. The best answer to 
each statement below is your personal opinion. We have tried to cover 
many different and opposing points of view; you may find yourself agreeing 
strongly with some of the statements, disagreeing just as strongly with 
others and perhaps uncertain about others; whether you agree or disagree 
with any statement you can be sure that many people feel the same as you do.
Mark each statement in the left margin according to how much you agree or
disagree with it. Please mark every one. Write +1, +2, +3, or -1, -2,
-3, depending upon how you feel in each case.
+1
+2
+3
I AGREE A LITTLE 
I AGREE ON THE WHOLE 
I AGREE VERY MUCH
I DISAGREE A LITTLE 
I DISAGREE ON THE WHOLE 
I DISAGREE VERY MUCH
5.
6 . 
7.
"g.
_L. The United States and Russia have just about nothing in common.
_2. The highest form of government is a democracy and the highest form
of democracy is a government run by those who are most intelligent.
_3. Even though freedom of speech for all groups is a worthwhile goal, 
it is unfortunately necessary to restrict the freedom of certain 
political groups.
_4. It is only natural that a person would have a much better acquaintance
with ideas he believes in than with ideas he opposes.
Man on his own is a helpless and miserable creature.
Fundamentally, the world we live in is a pretty lonesome place.
Most people just don't give a "damn" for others.
  ll'd like it if I could find someone who would tell me how to solve
my personal problems.
 9. It is only patûral for a person to be rather fearful for the future.
10. There is so much to be done and so little time to do it in.
11. Once I get wound up in a heated discussion I just can't stop.
12. In a discussion I often find it necessary to repeat myself several
times to make sure I am being understood.
13. In a heated discussion I generally become so absorbed in what I am 
saying that I forget to listen to what the others are saying.
14. It is better to be a dead hero than to be a'.live coward.
15. While I don't like to admit this even to myself, my secret ambition 
is to become a great man like Einstein, or Beethoven, or Shakespeare.
16. The main thing in life is for a person to want to do something ' 
important.
17. If given the chan.ce, I would do something of great benefit to the 
world.
18. In the history of mankind there have probably been just a handful 
of really great thinkers.
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_19. There are a number of people I have come to hate because of the 
things they stand for.
_20. A man who does not believe In some great cause has not really 
lived.
_21, It Is only when a person devotes himself to an Ideal or cause that 
life becomes meaningful.
_22. Of all the different philosophies which exist In this world there 
Is probably only one which Is correct.
_23. A person who gets enthusiastic about too many causes Is likely to 
be a pretty "wishy-washy" sort of person.
_24. To compromise with our political opponents Is dangerous because It
usually leads to a betrayal of our own side.
_25. When It comes to differences of opinion In religion we must be care­
ful not to compromise with those who believe differently from the 
way we do.
_26. In times like these, a person must be pretty selfish If he considers
primarily his own happiness.
_27. The worst crime a person could commit Is to attack publicly the 
people who believe In the same thing he does.
_28. In times like these It Is often necessary to be more on guard against 
Ideas put out by people or groups In one's own camp than by those 
In opposing camps.
_29. A group which tolerates too much differences of opinion among Its own 
members cannot exist for long.
_30. There are two kinds of people In this world: those who are for
truth and those who are against the truth.
_31. Ify blood bolls whenever a person stubbornly refuses to admit he's 
wrong.
_32. A person who thinks primarily of his own happiness Is beneath 
contempt.
_33. Most of the Ideas which get printed nowadays aren't worth the paper 
they are printed on.
_34. In this complicated world of ours the only way we can know what's 
going on Is to rely on leaders or experts who can be trusted.
_35. It Is often desirable to reserve judgment about what's going on 
until one has had a chance to hear the opinions of those one 
respects.
36. In the long run the best way to live Is to pick friends and 
associates whose tastes and beliefs are the same as one's own.
37. The present Is all too often full of unhappiness. It Is only the 
future that counts.
38. If a man Is to accomplish his mission In life It Is sometimes 
necessary to gamble "all or nothing at all."
39. Unfortunately, a good many people with whom I have discussed Important 
social and moral problems don't really understand what's going on.
40. Most people just don't know what's good for them.
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INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE SECOND TESTING SESSION
Today we would like to ask your cooperation in helping us to deter­
mine current trends in opinions and comprehensive abilities among college 
students. In the booklet you have been given are several different types 
of scales and/or judgment tasks. Each portion of this booklet provides a 
simple method for you to indicate your opinions or judgments. It should 
also be called to your attention that this booklet is designed to determine 
general impressions of college students; therefore, if some of the tasks do 
not seem precise enough, it is because they are not supposed to be.
In a few minutes you will hear four tape recordings. Each recording 
is a radio press release of a man who is prominent in his field and who is 
speaking about a recent or current controversy. (HERE THE EXPERIMENTER 
"AD-LIBBED" Statement A . SEE NEXT PAGE). In the booklet you have received, 
we would like for you to give your personal ideas and judgments at four 
different times:
1. Before you hear each tape you will be told who the person is and 
the topic he is commenting about on the press release. From what you 
know about the person and the topic of his press release, please 
indicate what position you expect him to support. The first page 
provides a convenient method for you to indicate your expectation.
An example is given below:
The position I expect (source) to support in his press release
on (topic) is:
 Oppose
Favor
You will notice the method above allows you to indicate the position 
you expect the source to support by simply checking either "favor" 
or "oppose."
2. After indicating what position ypu expect the source to support, 
you will hear the tape recorded press release.
3. Following the press release, a standard and simple opinion scale 
is provided. The purpose of this Step is to determine your opinion of 
the person and the topic by having you judge each of them using a 
series of descriptive scales. Please use the scales according to what 
they mean to you. On the next two pages of the booklet you will find
a convenient means for judging the speaker and his topic. Here is how 
you use the scales :
If you feel the concept (VIRTUE) above each set of scales is 
extremely related to one end of the scale, you should place your 
mark as follows: viR^uE
Smal 1 X :____ :____ :____ :_____:____ :____ Big
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or
Smal 1____:____ :____ :_____:______:___: X Big
If you feel the concept is quite closely related to one or the 
other end of the scale you should place your mark as follows:
Right :____:____ :_____;______ : X :____Wrong
or
Right____ :____ :____:_____ :___ :_____ :___ Wrong
If the concept seems only slightly related to one side then you 
should mark:
Silly____ :____ :____:______: X :____ :___ Reserved
or
Silly____ ;____ : X :_____ :___ :_____;___ Reserved
If you consider the concept of the judgment to be neutral on 
the scale, both sides of the scale equally associated with the 
concept, or if the scale is completely irrelevant, then place 
your mark in the middle space:
FI at____ :____ :____: X :___ :_____:___ Round
4. It will^be necessary for you to listen to the recorded press
release closely for this portion of the booklet. You will be asked to
indicate simply the position that you feel the person's press release 
actually supported. A simple method for indicating your judgment is 
given below:
  Extremely in favor of the topic
  Qiiite strongly in favor of the topic
  Slightly in favor of the topic
  Slightly opposed to the topic
  Quite strongly opposed to the topic
  Extremely opposed to the topic
During this exercise we are interested in obtaining your personal views 
and opinions. There is no such thing as a good or bad grade on this 
test--it is merely a survey. Also, how you perform on this test will 
not in any way affect your grade in the class. We are merely asking 
your cooperation in this survey.
Please remain silent until everyone is finished with the last page 
of the booklet so that you will not bother or influence the response 
of others.
DO NOT TURN THIS PAGE UNTIL SO INSTRUCTED::
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ORAL INSTRUCTIONS AND COMMENTS BY EXPERIMENTER 
WHICH WERE NOT PRINTED ON BOOKLETS
Exposition Prior to Second Testing Session
This booklet represents a natiom-wide survey of college students. A 
professor at another University's Public Surveys department asked 
Oklahoma University to take a sampling of its students because the research 
being done here at 0. U. is similar to that being conducted on his campus. 
His sampling of students on various campuses allows him to speak of college 
students in general, rather than being restricted to speaking of students 
in a limited geographical area or on a specific campus.
Statement A
In our age of modern mass communications, I am sure that you are aware 
of the press releases that are used on radio and television newscasts 
and public information programs. The recordings you will hear are some 
of these.
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CHRONOLOGY OF TESTING INSTRUMENTS USED FOR EACH PRESS RELEASE 
USED DURING THE SECOND TESTING SESSION^
I: Expectancy Measure
The position I expect (source) to support in his press release 
on (topic) is:
Favor
_Oppose
II: "Stop" Page
III: Attitude Toward Source
Pleasant_
Big_
Worthless_
Unemotional_
Tasty_
Passive
Fair_
Disreputable_
Clean
Excited '
_Unpleasant
Little
_Valuable
Emotional
_Distasteful
_Active
Unfair
_Reputable
_Dirty
Calm
^Each step indicates a separate page of the test booklet.
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CHRONOLOGY OF TESTING INSTRUMENTS . . . (Continued)
IV: Attitude Toward Topic
Unfair
Active
Dirty_
Emotional
Tasty_
Calm_
Pleasant
Little_
Worthless
Reputable_
Fair
Passive
Clean
_Unemotional
_Distasteful
_Excited
_Unpleasant
_Big
Valuable
_Disreputable
V: Perception Test
The position supported by the speaker in the press release 
I just heard was:
  Extremely in favor of the topic
  Quite strongly in favor of the topic
  Slightly in favor of the topic
  Slightly opposed to the topic
  Quite strongly opposed to the topic
  Extremely opposed to the topic
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IDENTIFICATION SHEET USED FOR BOTH TESTING SESSION BOOKLETS 
Name Name of Course
Section No.
Classification: (circle one) Fresh Soph Junior Senior Unclass.
Age_____________  Sex: M F
Major area of study:___________________________________________________________
Please comment on what you thought about this survey:
APPENDIX D
ASSERTION NO. 1:
Favoring "The Supreme Court Ruling Banning Prayer in the Public Schools"
The recent ruling of the United States' Supreme Court which banned 
prayer and bible reading in the public schools, has received much unearned 
criticism as a result of uninformed citizenry and slanted journalism. îtost 
of the individuals and groups who opposed the ruling had no specific know­
ledge of its cause or purpose. What has not been publicized are the deci­
sions of reputable groups and organizations who spent some time studying 
the advantages and disadvantages of the ruling and who now support the 
ruling wholeheartedly. After a longer consideration, most people find that 
it is not as ill-conceived and as radical as they first thought. In fact, 
many people have come to actually defend the ruling as a protection of our 
religious freedom rather than an infringement. By banning prayers and bibèe 
readings from the public schools, the government is protecting the student 
from having prayers "forced" upon him by an institution of the State. The 
families who first lodged the complaint leading to the Supreme Court ruling, 
did so because the prayers their children were required to recite were neither 
complimentary to nor in agreement with their chosen religion. While such 
cases are presently in the minority, it is not inconceivable that a govern­
ment controlled institution, such as the public school, could soon dictate 
religion and other equally moral areas in the same manner that it now 
handles text-books, school zoning, and teaching methods. State control 
of religion in the public schools is not yet a serious threat, but the 
fact that it might become so without restrictions such as the recent ban, 
cannot be ignored. If the best interests of our country are to be served 
in the future, adequate safeguards must be provided today. This Supreme 
Court ruling provides such a safeguard. The strength of our country is in 
our ability to anticipate the future. History has shown the advantage of 
church and state separation--the Supreme Court ruling guarantees that 
Such separation will continue to exist.
ASSERTION NO. 2:
Opposing "The Supreme Court Ruling Banning Prayer in the Public Schools"
The criticism and notoriety caused by the recent Supreme Court ruling 
banning prayers and bible readings in public schools is well deserved and 
tends to prove the citizenry of the United States is not as dormant as 
sometimes suspected. When the Federal courts took a hand in banning prayer 
in the schools, the very act was an extension of the government into an area 
of human belief that is not answerable to the federal law. The Constitution
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separates church and state and it guarantees only the right to practice 
religion with freedom. It does not and should not dictate when and where 
religion should or should not be practiced. Of the groups who supported 
the ruling soon after it was made, many did so with insufficient informa­
tion. They originally viewed the ruling as a religious protection; this, 
of course, is not so. When the government can legislate via the court­
rooms how and where religion is allowed, it is sufficiently evident that
the separation of church and state no longer exists. The Supreme Court 
ruling can then be seen as a direct violation of the laws designed to 
protect us from suppression of religious beliefs. The families who were 
responsible for causing the Supreme Court ruling, raised their complaints 
because their children were being required to recite prayers contrary to 
their chosen religion; however, by freeing their own children from a form of 
religious oppression, they inflicted religious oppressions upon countless 
other children by depriving them of the opportunity to pray and study the 
bible together in their schools. This, of course, was not the intention 
of the original complaints. It is apparent now that the question of prayer 
in public schools should have been handled on a local basis, such as, in 
a parent-teacher meeting, and not in our federal courts; however, the 
decision was called for and the decision was made. It remains for us to 
now find some means to counteract this unfortunate precedent that the 
Supreme. Court has handed down. We must not let any form of government
legislate our religious beliefs and practices.
ASSERTION NO. 3;
Favoring "A Treatv Between the U. S and Russia Banning Underground
Nuclear Testing"
I believe that Russian proposals for banning underground nuclear 
testing should be seriously considered by the United States. This is the 
next logical step following the treaty already in existence between the 
United States and Russia which agreed to discontinue testing in the atmos­
phere, in space and underwater. The earlier treaty indicates a willingness 
of both countries to reduce the probability of a nuclear war. Both countries 
know that they have sufficient weapons already in existence to annihilate 
each other and make the world non-inhabitable; therefore, why should we 
continue to test more powerful weapons? As the United States and Russia 
continue to build their nuclear arsenals, they do not increase their mili­
tary effectiveness, they merely increase the possibility of an "accidental" 
nuclear war--caused by a misguided missile or an irresponsible human act. 
Secondly, and of equal importance, is the fact that the present research 
facility used in nuclear testing could be put to better use producing 
peaceful atomic knowledge. The uses we now have for atomic power represent 
only a fraction of what we could accomplish. A peaceful competitive situa­
tion between the United States and Russia to produce peaceful uses for the 
atom could result in less friction between the countries. A similar situa­
tion created by the "space race" provides an excellent example of peaceful 
competition. Moreover, the situations provide peaceful precedents for
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other countries to follow. Finally, the stock-piling of unneeded atomic 
weaponry is costing the tax-payer money. Each year we pump millions of 
dollars into a program which could better be spent elsewhere. I feel that 
the evidence I have mentioned is both obvious and conclusive reason for 
accepting additional proposals from Russia for discontinuing underground 
atomic nuclear testing.
ASSERTION NO, 4:
Opposing "A Treaty Between the United States and Russia Banning Underground
Nuclear Testing"
I believe that Russian proposals for banning underground nuclear 
testing should not be considered by the United States. The agreement now 
in effect which bans nuclear testing in the atmosphere, in space, and 
underwater is enforceable by existing reconaissance methods, whereas we have 
no methods for detecting small underground tests. If Russia had a history 
as a government of integrity, the situation would be different. However, 
we have seen in Cuba, in Berlin, in Viet Nam, and Czechoslovakia how the 
communists are restricted to the terms of a treaty only by overwhelming 
political and military forces. Time after time the communists have violated 
treaties when it was advantageous for them to do so. An earlier proposal made 
by the United States which provided for neutral inspection teams was rejected 
by Russia. Such action obviously indicates their lack of good faith in 
attempts to establish valid and binding agreements with the free world; 
therefore, if the U. S agrees to ban underground testing without the use of 
inspection teams, we would be providing the communist powers another strate­
gic areas in which they could "cheat" with little fear of being detected. 
Proposals for banning underground testing also will affect the domestic 
advances since the end of World War II. The knowledge and understanding of 
the atom that we now possess is a direct result of our developing atomic 
weapons. Only because of our fear of war and our need for stock-piled 
atomic weapons did we place emphasis upon atomic research and development. 
Therefore, as long as some nuclear testing is allowed to proceed the U. S. 
kill be increasing her technological growth and at the same time she will 
increase her military strength. My final comment may not be so important, 
but I feel it should be mentioned . . . Our testing sites in Nevada and 
other places employ thousands of persons. If we suddenly quit using these 
test sites, this large number of persons would be dumped upon the unemploy­
ment lists almost overnight. It would be the responsibility of the; govern­
ment to either re-locate or retrain— or both--these persons. Such a task 
is not easily done without considerable hardship to the employees and to the 
taxpayer who must finance this transition. I feel the reasons I have 
mentioned are both obvious and conclusive reasons for the United States to 
reject Russian proposals for discontinuing the underground atomic nuclear 
testing.
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ASSERTION NO. 5:
Favoring "A Proposal to Finance Medical Care for the Aged by Increasing
Social Security Assessments"
It is becoming increasingly evident that some plan must be devised 
to ease one of our country's most pressing and honorable problems--that of 
providing for our senior citizens. Geriatrics--the care of the aged--has 
become a significant problem since the machine age and its average retire­
ment age of 65. The average working person can now be expected to live to 
the age of 75 years which makes millions of persons face the problems of 
living at least 10 years of their lives on a minimum income. Unfortunately 
it is during the last 10 years of a person's life that he is most vulnerable 
to the tragedy of extensive and expensive medical care and treatment. Thus, 
the retired person is often expected to pay major medical expenses with an 
income that is minimal. A few of our senior citizens are fortunate to have 
families who will provide the necessary care, but even this is often not a 
solution. The financial and psychological burden of caring for elderly 
parents and "in-laws" is often "solved" by committing them to ill-equipped 
"old-folks homes" or to mental institutions. I feel the only realistic 
solution to this situation is some form of medical care plan which provides 
and guarantees care for the aged. Many private insurance and medical firms 
have plans through which a person can provide such care for his last years; 
however, the plans are voluntary and therefore cover only a small portion 
of our older generation. Also, the amount of care possible is dependent 
upon how much money has. been paid into the plan prior to the retirement 
years and upon the number of people that subscribe to each company's plan. 
Generally speaking, such private attempts to alleviate the problem of old 
age have been minimally successful. The most obvious solution to this 
situation is an extension of our present social security system. Such a 
plan would insure a maximum number of subscribers, thus, keeping the indivi­
dual payments minimal, ^he payments will represent both employee and em­
ployer's contributions during the individual's active years. Another im- 
pôrtant consideration is that the cost of handling the paperwork of such a 
plan will not require extensive overhead expenses. By merely extending the 
present facility of our social security department, the medical care plan 
can be efficiently and economically handled. This plan, as I have summarized 
it, is convenient and efficient. If put into effect, it will almost erase 
one of the most pressing social problems of our age. It will provide 
maximum potential returns for minimal investment and it can be adequately 
handled by a system already in existence. We must provide for our aged, 
and an extension of the social security system is the only realistic 
method of accomplishing the task.
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ASSERTION NO. 6:
Opposing "A Proposal to Finance Medical Care for the Aged by Increasing
Social Security Assessments"
Recently a proposal to begin a medical care plan for persons over 65 
years of age which would be financed by increased social security was pro­
posed to the Senate Ways and Means Committee. Proponents of this proposal 
argue that the currently large number of senior citizens now requires that 
such a plan be adopted. I disagree. It is true that we have a larger 
elder generation than we have had before, but it is also true that we have 
many more state-supported hospitals, sanitoriums, and rest homes than ever 
before. Competent care for the aged can be obtained free of charge, if 
necessary, in any state of our Union. Why then, do we need a federal agency 
for such medical care for the aged when our state's all have adequate 
systems? Each senior citizen has several possibilities available to him 
should he require medical care; the first and most obvious place for him to 
go would be to his savings and insurance plans which he accumulated during 
his active life. There are hundreds of medical insurance companies who offer 
plans both on an individual basis and through group insurance plans of 
corporations and small businesses. Often such plans are required by employers 
who, incidentally, help pay a portion of the monthly premium for the employee. 
Such plans now provide for a great number of our retired senior citizens. 
Secondly, the elderly person usually has a family who can provide medical 
care and housing, if necessary. Most persons consider the care of their 
parents a personal obligation and would not want the government to inter­
fere in their personal lives. Thirdly, as I mentioned earlier, every State 
of the Union has provisions for state hospitals, etc., and have facilities 
and budgets set aside by their state legislature for such purposes. Ify 
strongest argument with the proposal is due to the expressed desire to 
finance the venture by increasing social security assessments. Such a 
system would surely be foolhardy. If we allowed the federal government to 
take over medical care proposals, we would beiitaking a step drastically close 
to turning our democracy into a socialistic state. If we are going to let 
the federal government control our medical history for the last ten years 
of our lives, why not let them dictate food rations, clothing rations, and 
other human needs? It seems to me such proposals just a few steps farther 
than the already existing government subsidies of farm products, unemploy­
ment, dairy products, railraods, and so on? Because 6f our trends toward 
socialism we should strongly oppose any legislation which attempts to place 
our senior citizens on federal controlled "give-away" programs. Our private 
insurance firms, our families, and our state governments are doing an 
adequate job now and will continue to do still a better job of providing 
medical care for the aged as time goes along. I urge you not to let your 
federal representatives support this proposal. Let them know that we do 
not need the system of social security and/or the federal government to 
care for our senior citizens. Let them know that we are not going to 
become a socialized nation.
145
ASSERTION NO. 7:
Favoring "A Voluntary Boycott in America of British-made Products to 
Discourage Britain from Selling Goods to Cuba"
I feel sure that the American public has not forgotten that less 
than six months prior to Cuba's î’sell-out" to Russia, Fidel Castro was in 
the United States, playing the role of a hero. It is now obvious that 
Castro was merely looking for the "highest bidder" with which to align his 
country. The reluctance of the United States to buy Cuba, has resulted in 
the long string of events which continue to lower the prestige of the 
United States in the eyes of the world. The distastefulness of Cuba's 
alliance with Russia, was illustrated by the people of Cuba in their attempt 
to effect a coup during the ill-fated Bay of Pigs invasion. This unfortunate 
incident was followed by a missile buildup in Cuba, which, in its turn, 
forced the United States to throw a naval blockade: around the island nation. 
While the Bay of Pigs invasion was a total failure, the blockade was at 
least partly effective. However, by using a blockade to defeat Russia's 
attempt to establish Cuba as a missile base, the United States "flirted" 
with all-out nuclear war. Such tactics should not be used except in extreme 
emergencies. Recently, trade relations have been established between Cuba 
and some of our allies, notably Britain. In the past month, English-made 
busses and heavy construction equipment have been sold to Cuba. If such 
trade continues to increase, Cuba will be able to buy the necessary 
ingredients from our allies that we risked war to prevent their getting 
from Russia. Obviously, we must prevent this. There are three general areas 
of pressure the United States can use to prevent Britain from trading with 
Cuba. They are: (1) military force, (2) political force, and (3) economic
pressures. The United States cannot risk war which might begin if military 
force is used. The United States has already brought political pressures 
to bear on England, and while it has helped, it has not prevented Britain's 
trade with Cuba. We must now use the economic pressures at our disposal.
The United States government cannot use official economic pressure without 
harming our own economy; therefore, it is up to the U. S- public to unoffi­
cially cause economic pressure. A boycott of British-made goods in America 
would result in such pressure. The boycott would strike at the heart of 
Britain's economy by placing that pressure on individual British exporters 
and corporations. For these reasons, I strongly urge all Americans to refuse 
to buy products which help keep the British economy strong. A boycott will 
help our country cope with a problem which it cannot safely handle otherwise.
ASSERTION NO. 8:
Opposing "A Voluntary Boycott in Americai.of British-Made Products to Discourage
Britain from Selling Goods to Cuba"
Recently it has been revealed that American allies such as England 
and France have been trading with Cuba. Because of earlier crises between
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Cuba and the United States, unofficial sources have taken it upon themselves 
to suggest that the American public boycott, or refuse to buy British-made 
products. Such a suggestion is not only impractical, but improbable as 
well. Such behavior by the United States public raises the question of in­
consistency in the minds of the other nations of the world. How can American 
merchants sell wheat to Russia and complain when Britain sells busses to 
Cuba. Realizing this, the federal government has discouraged such a boycott 
in America. Déan Rusk, Secretary of State, has stated that such a boycott 
would not only be inefficient, but also foolish. The U. S is dependent upon 
England for many natural resources. To refuse to buy some resources would 
harm the United States more than it would harm Britain. Secretary Rusk has 
also asked the public to ignore any person who advocates such a boycott. I 
am inclined to agree with Secretary Rusk. Not only because such a boycott 
would be inefficient, but because it would also tend to encourage friction 
between the United States and Britain. I think that history has made clear 
that a country with a sound economy is reluctant to go to war. And we 
cannot take a chance on a nuclear war. Rather we should encourage free trade 
among all countries of the world. The old saying that a person with a "full 
belly'Vdoesn't feel like being ornery is especially true in this case. Even 
in the past ten years, one can observe that the countries with economic 
advantages, such as the United States, Russia, and Britain, use all the forces 
in their power to avoid war, while economically unsound nations such as the 
Congo, Korea and Red China, continue to stir up friction and cause trouble.
If the United States encouraged or participated in a boycott of British goods, 
it would do nothing but cause ill-feelings between the countries. I cannot, 
and I hope that you cannot subscribe to the theory that trouble can be 
solved by creating more trouble. For these reasons, I would strongly urge 
that we discourage talk or action in favor of a boycott of British products. 
Such a boycott could not conceivably help our country's cause and would be 
more likely to cause other and more serious problems.
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1 = 3 3 19 F 29 20 50 14 1 -6 14
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19 19 M 36 10 28 11 - 8 1 15
23 18 F 36 - 17 35 16 -1 -1 12
26 19 M 36 12 30 12 -6 0 -31
29 19 M 31 18 21 24 -10 6 -24
35 18 F 36 18 36 16 0 -2 -8
37 29 M 34 14 31 19 -3 5 -9
3-3 48 18 F 34 20 35 13 1 -7 -25
49 18 F 34 11 35 9 1 -2 -17
50 18 F 32 20 35 14 3 -6 -14
54 19 M 36 14 42 18 6 4 16
4-2 59 20 F 33 18 33 17 0 -1 -34
5-3 99 18 M 31 19 20 17 -11 -2 -9
8-3 143 19 M 34 13 35 15 1 2 -4
148 21 F 29 16 30 14 1 -2 -10
151 20 M 41 13 37 6 -4 -7 -18
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48 18 F 10 41 13 34 3 -7 -25
54 19 M 6 39 30 35 24 -4 16
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13 25 F 16 42 35 30 19 - 8 -48
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6-3 110 18 F 11 29 10 11 -1 -18 -15
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129 20 F 9 42 13 42 4 0 0
135 21 M 13 39 19 38 6 -1 -42
137 19 M 6 30 19 21 13 -9 6
139 23 M 7 33 33 35 26 2 17
141 22 M 6 39 42 42 36 3 -13
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4-2 68 20 F 6 32 22 17 16 -15 -12
4-4 74 21 M 6 36 9 37 3 1 -14
79 18 M 18 30 25 25 7 -5 -25
5-3 92 18 M 13 32 22 23 9 -9 -38
8-2 143 19 M 9 35 23 20 14 -15 -4
148 21 F 17 34 21 21 3 -13 -10
151 20 M 6 42 7 29 1 -13 -18
157 18 M 14 38 31 22 17 -16 -10
158 19 M 15 42 28 23 13 -21 -46
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Expected Favorable Assertion, Perceived Favorable Assertion (F-F)
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24 20 M 15 15 15 30 0 15 24
27 19 M 9 15 12 24 3 9 -8
28 18 M 8 6 19 24 11 18 -14
32 19 M 10 15 19 27 9 12 17
3-1 52 18 M 13 13 17 30 4 17 13
3-2 46 18 F 10 16 13 21 3 5 -18
3-4 42 19 F 16 9 15 15 -1 6 -25
43 18 F 11 16 23 21 12 5 -37
47 18 M 14 19 26 26 12 7 -5
4-1 74 21 M 17 6 22 6 5 0 -14
5-1 84 18 M 20 6 35 36 15 30 -23
91 19 M 7 9 19 9 12 0 -28
95 20 M 8 6 33 26 25 20 5
99 18 M 16 15 35 28 19 13 -9
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6-3 115 19 M 17 19 24 16 7 -3 -23
117 19 M 16 14 30 29 14 15 41
7-4 133 19 M 19 17 23 15 4 -2 -28
134 19 M 8 15 16 28 8 8 -38
Unfavorable Attitude Toward Source, Unfavorable Toward Topic (S-T-) 
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1-4 6 21 F 19 10 40 13 21 3 16
3-4 44 18 F 6 19 18 40 12 21 -40
46 18 F 20 9 26 27 6 18 -18
5-1 96 20 M 12 15 28 28 16 13 10
6-4 120 18 M 20 14 29 16 9 2 3
7-1 128 18 M 6 18 42 34 36 16 -8
7-4 131 21 M 14 11 20 25 6 14 29
139 23 M" 6 12 7 20 1 8 17
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1-3 1 19 M 9 6 15 6 6 0 30
4 18 F 10 13 16 12 6 -1 2
6 21 F 6 8 7 6 1 -2 16
4-2 66 18 F 17 6 32 9 15 3 -21
82 19 M 14 14 16 12 2 -2 7
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4-4 59 20 F 10 17 22 18 12 1 -34
61 19 M 6 6 30 6 24 0 -3
68 20 F 9 12 31 6 23 -6 -12
73 20 F 9 9 26 6 17 -3 14
80 19 F 6 12 6 6 0 -6 -21
5-3 88 18 ¥ 9 8 9 8 0 0 23
96 20 M 14 7 20 10 6 3 10
98 19 M 18 18 22 15 ':4 -3 4
6-1 111 19 M 20 19 22 16 2 -3 -7
116 18 F 16 20 27 18 11 -2 6
120 18 M 12 12 22 12 10 0 3
8- 4 146 18 M 10 18 7 27 -3 9 -31
155 21 M 12 12 24 19 12 7 -20
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1-3 11 20 F 16 8 17 15 1 7 -19
2-1 23 18 F 13 17 33 6 20 -11 12
28 21 M 15 7 15 8 0 1 -14
4-2 65 18 F 19 13 36 9 17 -4 19
75 20 M 19 20 23 7 4 -13 31
76 18 M 11 16 23 9 14 -7 0
4-4 62 26 M 19 12 30 6 11 -6 -48
64 19 M 19 16 24 18 5 2 -1
69 18 M 8 12 13 14 5 2 -51
72 20 M 14 13 18 - 15 4 2 2
81 18 M 20 19 22 22 2 3 -32
5-3 87 21 M 9 12 19 19 10 7 41
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6-1 107 20 F 13 16 28 17 15 1 -53
108 18 F 20 12 30 14 10 2 -41
113 19 M 9 20 26 16 17 -4 5
8-3 146 18 M 17 6 21 11 4 5 -31
8-4 148 21 F 19 17 12 14 -7 -3 -10
